

# 中國存亡問題

孫文



## THE VITAL PROBLEM OF CHINA

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# THE VITAL PROBLEM OF CHINA

(Written in 1917)

## Chapter I

### WHY SHOULD CHINA JOIN THE ALLIES?

Do countries exist because wars take place, or do wars take place because countries exist? In considering the origin of countries we find that these were formed generally for the purpose of aggression or defense. While aggression means war, defense against aggression cannot go without warfare either. As war cannot be waged by individuals acting singly, these individuals formed themselves into communities for this purpose. As communities cannot be without a definite system of organization, there emerged a leader among each community. As leaders cannot govern the mass for one day only, communities became permanent organizations in the form of States. Thus, in the earliest stages, States were formed only as a means to wage wars; should there be no wars, there would be no States.

The question of how countries could start fighting if by some means they could be maintained permanently in an unchangeable condition, leaves in practice no room for discussion, for, as a matter of fact, they were perpetually at war with each other and had no need to commence hostilities. The countries of today, however, are absolutely different from what they were in ancient times. Every country now has a national ideal to strive after; they no longer exist only to wage wars. It is true that, occasionally, they find it necessary to resort to war, but their object is either to preserve their national existence or to extend their national boundaries, and war is but the means of gaining their ends. Hence, countries of today fight in order to exist; they are not formed only for the purpose of warfare.

An ancient adage says, "The army is an evil, and war is perilous."

It is further said, "The maintenance of an army is a matter of great importance to a nation. It constitutes the decisive factor in the national destiny. No nation can afford to neglect it." When a nation embarks on a war, it is because she has no alternative. Even when she emerges victorious from a war as hoped, it is still uncertain whether she will be able to attain

her goal. If the result is not in accordance with her hopes, her very existence will, after defeat, be in question. So when a nation stakes everything on the hope of winning a war, it is because she has no way to preserve her existence or to achieve expansion other than by recourse to arms.

It is essential that the interests involved in the war be the interests of the whole nation and not that of a minority if the people are wholeheartedly to join the war and not fall back when marching forward, nor utter complaints should they be wounded. The countries of today are different from what they were in the former days. In the past, neighboring nations attacked each other frequently. Peace was precarious and consequently war unavoidable. Today, treaties are concluded and envoys exchanged between nations as pledges of everlasting friendship. Courtesy is maintained even between countries which have signed no treaties and exchanged no envoys; they no longer invade each other. Nations will not light-heartedly start a war against one another; they resort to force only when other means are of no avail. After all, what is the purpose of challenging another country to war when there is no absolute necessity?

Nowadays, nations cannot carry on war for ever; diplomatic dealings between nations are further increasing from day-to-day. When international relations are thus becoming more and more intimate and when war is generally no longer resorted to for the purpose of national existence or territorial expansion, some other means must be found for the fulfillment of national aspirations. This is where diplomacy comes in. After a country has mapped out a certain policy, it must first seek its realization by diplomacy, and it is only after it has exhausted all its diplomatic resources, that it may resort to war. At the conclusion of hostilities diplomatic relations will usually be resumed. Thus, in international relations, diplomacy and force are both indispensable in enforcing national policies. Diplomacy, however, is more often employed than armed force; the former is used as a rule and the latter only when there is no other alternative.

Take, for instance, the recent case of the United States of America and Germany. Following the sinking by a German submarine of the "*Lusitania*" (a British vessel flying the American flag and carrying among her passengers some Americans who met their death) the United States repeatedly protested against the tactics employed by Germany. But no

sooner had a protest been accepted by Germany than a further incident took place. This state of affairs continued until this year (1917) when the sinking of American ships without warning culminated in the rupture of relations between the two countries. There was a lapse of a period of two years from the sinking of the "*Lusitania*" to the final rupture; this showed how cautiously the situation was handled.

In China's case, can it be said that she has exhausted all her diplomatic resources? In the last two years the Allies had inflicted incalculable losses on the Chinese, but this fact was completely ignored by China. Nor, to our knowledge, had she make any investigation of the submarine tactics employed by Germany in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Yet, the moment she heard that the United States had broken off relations with Germany, she began at once to protest to Germany, and before she received any reply, severed relations with Germany. Can it be said that China has exhausted all her diplomatic resources and yet failed to get what she wanted? In her reply to China's protest, Germany declared that submarine attacks had done no damage to Chinese vessels, and offered to enter into negotiations with China for the protection of Chinese lives and property. We should say that Germany was considerate enough. If, supposing, China had reached an understanding with Germany whereby Chinese passengers would travel only on Dutch boats, or on boats designated by Germany, and whereby Germany guaranteed that she would not attack such vessels, then Chinese people would be able to travel safely to Europe. As Germany was willing to open negotiations with us, why should we refuse to enter into negotiations with her? Germany had made it known that the issues between her and China could be settled by diplomatic procedure, but we refused to enter into negotiations with her and, instead, were bent on joining the war. Can China's situation be considered as similar to that of the United States? America dealt with Germany diplomatically for two years, whereas China in dealing with Germany resorted to diplomacy only for one month. America declared war on Germany when all diplomatic measures were of no avail, but China abruptly adopted the extreme measure of joining the conflict before her diplomatic resources were exhausted. Can it be said that China has no alternative but to fight?

Until recently, China had always been content with her isolation from the outside world. When she was not busy subduing other peoples she was usually engaged in internecine warfare. True it is that at times China

was on amicable relations with the Huns, Turkestanians, and the Tungus, but such short-lived peace was always obtained by bribery. There was no such thing as diplomacy. And it was just because of this lack of experience in diplomacy that when her doors were thrown open to the outside world she was prone to quarrel with foreign countries. Every conflict ended in China being despoiled of her sovereign rights. Consequently she became every submissive and wanted nothing but to save "face." In time, however, she began to lose patience and fell to quarrelling again. Although she maintained ordinary diplomatic relations she had no real diplomacy. Following closely upon the heels of the Opium War came the Sino-French Wars of 1856 and 1884, then the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, and, finally the Boxer War of 1900. Every conflict ended in loss of territory, payment of indemnities and impairment of interests, resulting in no benefit whatsoever.

In her relations with foreign countries, China was handicapped by the ignorance of diplomacy, not by a reluctance to fight. Diplomacy does not necessarily mean favoritism to some foreign countries and discrimination against others. Japan was once a diplomatic failure like China, but gradually, as she became acquainted with the methods of diplomacy, she mended her ways until foreign consular jurisdiction was abolished and her custom tariff readjusted. She did not have to use force to realize her aspirations, nor was it necessary for her to antagonize any foreign country to achieve success. Siam is a far smaller country than China, and yet, by following the example of Japan by the use of diplomatic methods, she succeeded in recovering her judicial and tariff rights.

The relations between two countries are, in a way, comparable to the relations between two individuals. There are cases in which, others could be benefited only at the expense of one's self. But there are also cases in which one can be benefited without the necessity of injuring others. To choose the way leading to the benefit of one's own country and at the same time not injuring others, that is the proper function of diplomacy. For, if a country persists in seeking to benefit herself at the expense of others, she will surely precipitate a war. Now the fruits of victory may compensate for the losses suffered during a war, but the consequences of defeat are unimaginable. China's mistake was that she did not rely on diplomacy by which she may secure the recovery of her lost rights, but, instead, relied on war the result of which is unpredictable. The early failure of China,

therefore, was the same as that of Japan who at first committed the same blunder. But Japan gradually mended her ways and recovered her losses, while China did not. At this moment, she is on the point of enacting another tragedy to add to her long series of tragedies, the last of which was the Boxer Incident. The line of action which she has chosen to follow is utterly absurd.

What obliged China to enter the war? Nobody can answer this question with definite evidence to support his opinion. If it be said that China is obliged to fight in the cause of justice, then is what Germany has committed more unjust than what Britain, France, and Russia did? If it be said that Germany's sinking of mercantile vessels without warning by submarines is inhuman, that she subjected Belgians and Serbians to cruel treatment, and that the forcible entry, into Belgium and Luxembourg was an act of injustice, then are the Allies any better off? Is there any difference between the marching of British troops into Greece and the marching of German troops into Belgium and Luxembourg? Soon after the outbreak of war, Britain declared that she would starve Germany into submission by cutting off her food supplies. Any news reaching England concerning the starvation of German woman and children is invariably received with rejoicing, while any report that Germany is rich in food and other necessities of life, is either received with disquietude or dismissed as false. How is this compared with the German maltreatment of Belgians and Serbians? However unkind the Germans may be towards the Belgians and Serbians, they do not go so far as to cut off their food supplies till they are starved to death.

As the maltreatment of Belgians and Serbians and the food blockade against Germany are both directed against enemies, we are at a loss to understand why the Anglo-French starvation policy is regarded as perfectly human while the exercise by Germany of preventive control over the people conquered by her as unpardonable. Every year England takes large quantities of foodstuffs for her own consumption from India, where in the last ten years 19,000,000 people have died of starvation. It must not be imagined for a moment that India is suffering from under-production. The fact is that what India has produced for herself has been wrested from her by England, with the result that the Indians themselves are starving. Is such action compatible with the principles of humanity? Is it any better than

submarine warfare? Are the Indians under obligation to give up their food to the British, while they are starving themselves?

Nominally, of course, the British are not plundering, but in fact, the exorbitant taxation and tyrannical rule in India are such as to make it impossible for the natives to maintain their livelihood; it is nothing but plunder on a grand scale. Recently, England has forced the Indians to subscribe £1,000,000,000 to a war fund and the subscription has been given the euphemism "Voluntary contribution from India." Actually the sum was extorted by heavy taxation. It was not without reason that when it was first proposed to collect contributions from India, the proposal met with stronger opposition from the British than from the Indians themselves. Lancashire businessmen realized that enforcement of the proposal would be followed by an increase in the tax on piece goods manufactured in Lancashire and shipped to India for sale, and accordingly they raised strong opposition. As a matter of fact, however, the taxation would cause the Lancashire businessmen only slight losses. As for the Indians, the payment of £1,000,000,000 must reduce them to such poverty as to compel them to sell their wives and children and ultimately die in the gutter; even so they cannot afford to pay the huge sum. Is this compatible with humanitarianism?

Let us turn to the way in which the French treat the Annamites. The taxation in French Indo-China has been growing heavier every year; the law is most severe and the slightest offense is liable to such heavy punishment that once they are thrown into prison it is very difficult for them to get out again. The fertile soil of Tonkin was formerly cultivated by the Annamites themselves. No sooner had the French started to rule Indo-China than they imposed heavy taxes on the native population; and taxes were increased from year to year until landowners were unable to meet their taxes with the money they received from the rent and peasants were unable to recover what they invested in the fields. Finally, the farmers and peasants had to give up their fields and migrate to cities to seek employment as laborers. Then there came a period during which the fertile land of Tonkin appeared like a vast desert. The Annamites starved and suffered terribly. Death followed one after the other, and the people who were fortunate enough to survive, had no longer any joy in life. Meanwhile, the French brought large numbers of their fellow-countrymen from their homeland to cultivate the deserted areas in Indo-China. The French tillers

had the privilege of being exempt from taxation. The so-called desert areas were really land which had previously been worked by Annamite cultivators but which had been deserted because these natives could not bear the heavy taxation. Is this compatible with the principles of humanity? England and France have treated their colonial subjects even more cruelly than Germany treats conquered nations, and yet it is said that they have not committed any offense against humanity.

It is said that Germany stands for Might, not for Right and that a German victory will spell the end of justice. But is the annexation of Transvaal, India and Malaya in accordance with the principles of justice? Is it right for England to rob China of Hong Kong and Burma, to force our people to buy and smoke opium and to mark out portions! of Chinese territory as her sphere of influence? Is it by right and justice that France seized Indo-China, and Russia seized Manchuria and invaded Outer Mongolia? The history of the last few decades does not speak well for the Allies; they also represent Might, not Right. A few decades ago, when England was strong enough to carry out acts of injustice, she had no respect for justice, but today, because she is not so strong as Germany, she charges the latter of being unjust, and at the same time takes care to forget her past aggressions. How can anybody be so simple-minded as to believe her words? If one really wants to champion the cause of justice today, one should first declare war on England, France and Russia, instead of on Germany and Austria. But, since China does not want to declare war even on England, France and Russia, there is even less reason for her to declare war on Germany and Austria.

We know that only few people have made the mistake of believing all this humbug about justice and humanitarianism, that the majority who advocate entry into the war, use the terms "justice" and "humanitarianism" hypocritically and do not really uphold such virtues. No sooner have these people made a speech about justice and humanitarianism than they let slip some words about advantages and disadvantages. Tuan Chi-jui was the first to say that China's object in entering the war was not to gain advantages but to avoid disadvantages. If war were an effective means for gaining advantages and removing disadvantages, then every Chinese would be glad to join the war to rid China of her disadvantages. But in the present case, we must first of all ask ourselves how far Germany has harmed our country, and why disadvantage can be avoided by participating in the war.

The factors indispensable to the existence of a nation are people, territory and sovereignty. When any of these is injured, a protest may be lodged, and if the protest proves to be of no avail, then a declaration of war will be justified. However, the extent of the injuries should be considered, and war should not be contemplated except in cases of the gravest injuries. Now, has Germany inflicted any harm on us since the outbreak of the war? The answer is "No," except for those who went to France as laborers and were drowned through the sinking of the vessels conveying them. These laborers had been induced by France to go to work in French munitions factories. England and France, knowing well that attacks against their ships are inevitable, have prohibited their own women and children from travelling by sea. They have, however, no such regard for Chinese laborers, many of whom on their way to Europe were drowned when the vessels were sunk. Is this not a trap set for the Chinese by the British and the French? Sometime ago the Japanese press reported that a camouflaged German cruiser was somewhere in the South Seas, and that there were over 300 persons on board, including 80 Chinese laborers. A few days later the Japanese press again reported that the cruiser had been sunk. It is presumed that the 80 Chinese were sent to the bottom of the sea together with the others on the vessel.

What is the difference between work on German vessels and working in French munitions factories? Why is it that China cannot lodge a protest with the Allies? The reason is simple enough. The Chinese, who worked on board the German cruiser, did so at their own risk; the drowning was due to their own fault; the Allied countries were not responsible. In this instance Germany was to be blamed for having lured the Chinese laborers into a precarious position; not the Allies for showing no mercy. On the other hand, it is equally plain that only France is to be blamed for the ill-fate of the Chinese laborers that were traveling to work in that country and that here Germany cannot be held responsible. Further, a great number of Chinese have been wrongfully put to death in some British and French Dominions. A few years ago, a number of Chinese laborers were hired to work in Russia and when the wages agreed upon were not paid in full and the men assembled to demand full payment, they were fired upon, and several hundreds were killed. A friend of mine, recently arrived from Russia, has described to me, with tears in his eyes, the helpless and forlorn condition of the surviving Chinese laborers in that country. This crime is a

hundred times more heinous than the sinking of enemy vessels by Germany involving Chinese casualties.

Why are we so tolerant towards the Allies and so un-reasonably severe towards Germany? If it is argued that China's entry into the war can save her people from peril, our reply to that argument is that, unless our navy is strong enough to wipe out the German submarines and accomplish what the combined British and French fleets cannot succeed in doing, the safety of Chinese lives cannot be assured. If, immediately upon the outbreak of the war, China had prohibited her nationals from traveling to Europe, she might have prevented these disasters. But China, after her declaration of war, has to send large numbers of laborers to work in Europe. Such a step amounts to inviting German attacks against merchant vessels and will surely have the effect of increasing Chinese casualties. How then can it be said that China's participation in the war is intended to eliminate the loss of Chinese lives?

It is indeed, impossible to know the future territorial ambitions of Germany. But we may say that among the Powers she has so far been the least aggressive towards China, and also the least ambitious. Speaking of territorial losses, China has ceded the richest areas in the Heilung-kiang Valley to Russia; Burma and Hong Kong to Britain; Indo-China to France; and Formosa to Japan; no land has been taken from us by Germany. Speaking of leased territories, England has occupied Kowloon and Weihaiwei, France has occupied Kwangchow Bay, and Russia has occupied Port Arthur and Dairen and turned them over to Japan. As to the occupation of Kiaochow, Germany is no more guilty than any of the other Powers. Since Kiaochow has now passed under Japanese control, there is still less danger of German infringement upon Chinese territorial sovereignty. Referring to foreign spheres of influence, British influence extends over Tibet, Szechwan and the Yang-tze Valley, representing approximately 28 per cent, of the whole of China, Russian influence extends over Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and North Manchuria, representing approximately 42 per cent of the whole of China; French influence extends over Yunnan and Kwangsi, and Japanese influence extends over South Manchuria, Eastern Outer Mongolia, Shantung and Fukien. The areas under French and Japanese influence each represent over 5 per cent, of the entire Chinese territory. Although Germany once established a sphere of influence in Shantung, the area was below 2 per cent, of the whole of China, i.e.

equal to between one 20th and one 30th of the area under British and Russian influence. Even the French and Japanese spheres of influence are several times larger than the erst-while German sphere of influence.

All these Powers have encroached upon China, but their encroachments differ in extent. Also, a distinction may be made between those countries which continue their encroachment and those countries which have discontinued their encroachment, at least for the time being. We persist in condemning that country which has, at least for the time being, discontinued its encroachment, while we pay no heed to the ever-increasing encroachments by the other Powers. Should we riot assist the Power which has encroached least? Verily, by joining the present war we shall encourage the foreign infringement of our sovereignty, instead of defending ourselves against foreign invasion. If we desire further encroachments upon our land, we might as well proclaim to the whole world that we are offering it for sale. There is no need to go through the trouble of waging a war with Germany.

It is true that Germany, following the examples of Britain and France, has also committed acts which constitute infringements upon our sovereignty. But comparatively, she is decidedly not so bad as Russia, whose stationing of troops in China and occupation of Chinese territory once led to a serious armed conflict, or as Britain, which was the first to establish consular jurisdiction and carve out a sphere of influence in China. Even now, after the outbreak of war and the reestablishment of our Republic, [i.e. after the overthrow of the Hung Hsien Dynasty of Yoan Shih-kai. –Editor] French authorities have sent agents across their boundaries to seize our policemen and extended their Concessions by force. Are such acts beneficial or are they prejudicial to our sovereignty?

The foreign press persists in expressing the view that the restrictions against the movement of Chinese troops in the Tientsin and Peking area, and against the erection of fortifications, as well as the right of stationing foreign troops in the Legation Quarter, have been imposed upon China as chastisement to remind the Chinese of the Boxer Rebellion. Since China is not free to build fortifications and move troops freely about in her own territory, does she still have any sovereignty? The stationing of foreign troops in our Capital by foreign Powers is in no way different from the manner in which Germany once treated France after a German victory. The

German occupation of the French Capital lasted only one year, but till now the French hate their enemy. Foreign troops have been stationed in Peking for nearly 20 years. Is it that this presence of foreign troops is beneficial to the sovereignty of China and therefore admits of no criticism? If China were completely free and independent, there would have been no foreign interference with her decision as to war and peace. In the present situations, the United States has shown the greatest tolerance towards Germany, and the European countries have not ventured the slightest complaint against the American attitude. China, on the other hand, is severely scolded by the Allies whenever they are even slightly dissatisfied with her way of dealing with Germany. The Allies have never shown any respect for China's sovereignty.

From the foregoing it is evident that all the talk about saving China from harm is nothing but humbug. The real object is to gain advantages. China has severed relations with Germany, not because of justice or self-defense but as a result of bribery. As far as the public are concerned, the bribe consists in the increase of customs tariff, suspension of indemnity payments, and revision of the Boxer Protocol. Bribes have also been taken by private individuals who have helped to bring about the rupture of relations with Germany, but since it is a delicate matter I would rather withhold the facts in substantiation of my statement.

## CHAPTER II

### CONDITIONS OF CHINA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

The so-called "conditions of entry into the war" are promises of an increase of the customs tariff, suspension of indemnity payments and revision of the Boxer Protocol, in addition to a \$100,000,000 loan. That is all. Is it worth-while to plunge the whole country into war for these terms? Certainly not. These so-called "conditions" can be obtained by diplomatic means; it is unnecessary to go to war to get them. In fact they can be obtained only by diplomacy, not by war.

Concerning the readjustment of the customs tariff, it has been suggested in some quarters that the tariff rate will be raised to 7.5 per cent, in accordance with the Mackay Treaty and to 12.5 per cent, after the end of the war when *likin* is to be abolished. In other quarters it has been suggested that the existing tariff will be revised with the old treaty as the basis and the new rate will be 5 per cent *ad valorem*. The first suggestion has now been completely dropped; the so-called "negotiations" are proceeding on the basis, of the second suggestion. A review of the history of our customs tariff convinces us that it is absurd to consider the second proposal as an advantage justifying our entry into the war.

The existing tariff is based on the Mackay Treaty concluded with Great Britain in 1902. Under that Treaty, the average prices prevailing during the three years after 1897 are taken as the standard of assessment, that is to say, the duties payable on all staple commodities are based on such prices. As the, prices in those years were much lower than the existing market prices, a nominal 5 per cent, tariff is actually only 3 or 4 per cent. Apparently, changes in prices were anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the Sino-British Treaty, which stipulates that at the expiration of ten years either party may, within a period of six months prior to the expiration, propose a revision of the tariff. Similar provisions are contained in the commercial treaties subsequently signed with other countries. As far back as August 1911, the year of the establishment of the Republic, China notified the diplomatic representatives of the foreign Powers in the Capital that the term of ten years had expired and that changes in the value of commodities necessitated a revision of the tariff. The various foreign diplomats were again notified in 1912. China's proposal was

unconditionally accepted by Great Britain, U.S.A., Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. Only Japan, Russia and France, while accepting the proposal, stipulated certain conditions for their acceptance. In other words, they desired some slight benefits in exchange for their consent to tariff revision; such, for example, as reduction of export duties on one or two particular commodities. By no means can these countries reject our proposal for revision which is provided for in the Treaties and cannot for any reason be objected to. Had it not been for the European war, this matter might have long ago been completely settled.

The suspension of negotiations for tariff revision during the war was merely an act of courtesy on the part of China, and if we should have insisted that the negotiations be renewed now, the Powers could not help but accept our request. It is unnecessary to break off relations with Germany and join the war in order to resume negotiations on the subject. At present, China regards tariff revision as a condition of her participation in the war, and the Powers concerned have come to regard it in the same light, insisting that the negotiations for tariff revision cannot be resumed unless and until China has joined the war. All this trouble is of China's own making. Had we continued the negotiations with the Powers without bringing up the question of entry into the war, the Powers would have long ago agreed to the tariff revision. Compared with the terms now under consideration, the terms of the Mackay Agreement of 1902 providing for the abolition of *likin* is infinitely more favorable to China. If the Mackay Agreement could be reached by negotiations, why must tariff revision now be conditioned by China's entry into the war? If an object can be attained by the ordinary procedure, there is no earthly reason to plunge the whole nation into danger in order to attain it. If the Allies make it so difficult for us to accomplish our object, why should we take the trouble of aiding them in their fight?

Turning to the subject of indemnity payments, China requests a moratorium of ten years, while the Powers insist that payments can be deferred only up to the time of the cessation of hostilities and that payments for the current years must not be suspended. That the war in Europe is expected to come to an end during this year, has been intimated not only by England and France but also by Germany and Austria. Apparently the whole world believes that the war will last no longer than another year. So, even if the hostilities should continue until next year, the postponement of

payment will be for the duration of only a few months, and, if the war should come to an end this year, there will have been no postponement at all. The proposed arrangement for the moratorium on indemnity payments is obviously intended to deceive the public. It is possible, of course, that the European conflict will continue for two or three years, in which case the indemnity payments will be suspended for the same length of time. But the benefit of suspension for one or two years is not absolutely unobtainable by diplomatic means. Has America not returned to us an enormous amount of indemnity funds? Did she require China to break off relations with, and declare war on, a third country as a condition of the refund? At the present time, the value of gold has fallen and indemnity payments have virtually been reduced as compared with the last two years. Besides, it is not improbable that the Powers are desirous of having the payments deferred in order to gain interest on the arrears. A moratorium means a temporary suspension, not the cancellation of all future payments. Furthermore, the financial resources rendered available by the postponement of the indemnity payments are likely to be applied to other purposes, in which case funds will have to be raised in the future to meet ultimately the payments. Thus, postponement of indemnity payments will neither benefit China nor prove detrimental to the Powers. And yet China must join the war to obtain consent to the moratorium!

Under the Boxer Protocol, China is not permitted to erect fortifications at Tientsin; restrictions are imposed on Chinese troop movements, while foreign Powers have the right to station troops in China "for the protection against the Boxers." The proposed revision of the Protocol is in-tended to remove such restrictions and to restrict the alien forces stationed in China. As may have long been realized, complete withdrawal of foreign troops from China is impossible. Even if China should enjoy a little more freedom than at present for the movement of troops and construction of fortifications, it is only a matter of "face-saving." But so long as foreign troops are stationed in our Capital to see that our Government does not offend the foreigners, there can be no talk of "face-saving," or respect for our sovereignty. With regard to "face-saving," Germany proposed before the outbreak of the war to reduce her forces in China and, if we knew how to use diplomacy skillfully, we would have brought about some modifications in the treaty provisions, even though the modifications may not be of great importance.



In consequence of China's own acceptance of such modifications being a condition of joining the war, the *North-China Daily News* and other foreign newspapers have emphatically declared: "The Boxer Protocol is meant to serve as a chastisement of the Chinese people and must not be modified lest they might forget the serious consequences of the Boxer Rebellion. If, however, it is desired to give some satisfaction to the Chinese people, slight modifications may be made in the minor provisions of the Protocol, and this only after China's entry into the war." The tone adopted by such newspapers gives the reader the impression that China is like a criminal in foreign custody, and that her request for treaty revision is in the nature of an application for pardon. The foreigners insist that China should redeem her sins by meritorious conduct before they may graciously consider an abatement of her sentence. Instead of endeavoring to free herself from restrictions by means of friendship, China has, curiously enough, chosen to assume the position of a prisoner before the bar. Can freedom thus obtained be regarded as a benefit at all?

To the Government the most alluring of all the "conditions" is the prospect of a foreign loan. Any loan to be in the nature of a true favor to China should neither require any guarantee or security, nor be subject to a discount, and should have been granted to her long ago for the relief of her distress. Only such a loan could be considered as a benefit. At this moment when negotiations for a loan from the United States are about to be concluded, the Four Power Consortium comes in with the proposal of a joint loan to China. It is a foregone conclusion that the latter loan will be subject to all the conditions of discount and security as in previous cases. Probably, had there been no talk of breaking off relations with, and entering the war against, Germany, the loan might have long ago become a success. The casual mention of a possible Chinese entry into the war has, on the contrary, given the United States a pretext for slowing up the negotiations. In truth, since the commencement of the war the wealth of the United States has increased to such an extent that the surplus money cannot find profitable investment – a situation which is causing some concern to that country. As investment in China is both safe and profitable, we should be able to obtain a loan whether we enter the war or not. Although it is the United States that persuaded us to adopt a hostile attitude towards Germany, yet it is unlikely that she approves of our declaration of war. Our entry into the war has really nothing to do with the obtaining of a loan.

To sum up, all those things generally referred to as "conditions of entry" into the war can be obtained by diplomatic procedure, and without the necessity of going into war. Rather, China's participation in the war will probably have the effect of thwarting her hopes of tariff revision, etc. The reason is this; China has entered into treaties with foreign countries providing for an equal share of interests by the Western Powers. Although we have broken off our relations with Germany, the day will come when we shall resume our relations with her, and, at that time, we shall not be able to compel her to agree to what has already been agreed to by England and France. Furthermore, tariff revision has long ago been promised us by Germany and Austria, and were it not for the severance of relations with them, they could have no excuse for breaking their promises. The rupture of relations has had the effect of canceling the promises and exacerbating German feelings towards China. In our peace talks with Germany and Austria, they will in all probability repudiate their promises, and then England, France, Japan and Russia will most probably 'do likewise by citing the stipulation of the equal share of interests. China will be unable to force Germany and Austria to concede to her the same things which England and France have promised her, while England and France will be able to force her to give them the same favorable treatment as she will give to Germany and Austria.

Thus even granted that we may bring about treaty revision by entering the war, we shall assuredly be obliged some day to forego the revision as a result of this very participation. The postponement of the indemnity payments and revision of the Boxer Protocol, which have not received the approval of Germany and Austria, will not be binding upon them. Should Germany and Austria, instead of agreeing to the postponement of indemnity payments and the revision of treaties, insist on enforcing the original treaties, Britain, France and their Allies will probably break their promises. Since there exists the principle of equal share of interests, any policy which China may try to carry out must have the approval of all the foreign Powers and the opposition of any one country to that policy will effectively block any action. Accordingly, when China desires to accomplish any project, she must avoid antagonizing the totality of the Treaty Powers. At present she has offended some Powers in order to please others, and it is almost certain that what has already been achieved will be ruined by reason of the equal share of interests principle.

We would now like to ask, "Are the so-called conditions of entry into the war advantageous or disadvantageous to the Allies?" If they were advantageous to both China and the Allies, an agreement on the subject would have been reached long ago, and the Allies would not have waited until now to offer them to China as conditions of entry into the war. If on the other hand the "conditions" are dis-advantageous to the Allies, their acceptance now would be temporary and reluctant, and even if Germany and Austria should, in the course of future peace talks, consent to the so-called "conditions," the Allies will probably instigate these two countries to raise objections in order that the Allies themselves may have an equal share of the interests thus obtained. How can we expect the Allies to aid China in the name of justice? If, however, the so-called "conditions" are exactions from the Allies, it will be a case of "taking advantage of another's precarious position to seek small profits," and, though the Allies have in the past wronged us, it would be against our conscience to take advantage of their precarious condition. In short, even if these "conditions" are obtained, they will be lost within a short while, as a result of our participation in the war. So, what can we expect to get out of the war?

There is absolutely no hope of securing the so-called "conditions" by participating in the war. Japan strongly opposes tariff revision, suspension of indemnity payments and treaty revision which, according to her, had been imposed as a penalty on China. When efforts were first made to induce China to join the war, a British official made out a list of these "conditions" and showed it to Lu Cheng-hsiang (the then Foreign Minister) as extraordinary benefits to China, and accordingly a report to this effect was made to the Chinese Parliament. After the rupture of relations with Germany, however, the said official, in answer to our enquiry concerning the attitude of the various diplomatic representatives, suddenly declared that the "conditions" had been suggested in a personal capacity and no official responsibility can be assumed. It is understood in informed quarters that the sudden change of attitude on the part of the foreign diplomats was due to Japanese opposition. England has exerted every effort to bring China into the world imbroglio and offered the "conditions" as bait, but the interests at stake are Japanese, not British, interests. Japan, in refusing to sacrifice her own interests for England's, has incurred British enmity, but England is afraid of the Japanese dominating influence in the Far East and dares not explain to the public the Japanese opposition to the "conditions." Hence the subterfuge of the British. The blind adherents of the pro-war

party are still babbling about the advantages of China's entry into the war, but are the advantages real?

On the contrary, we can see very clearly the disadvantages. As a sequel to China's declaration of war, Chinese Mohammedans, who owe allegiance to their religious leader, will probably start trouble. This possibility has not only been emphasized by intelligent observers of the world situation but also demonstrated by recent events in Sinkiang and Kansu. Needless to say, such trouble will grow into serious proportions. In addition to this, there are two other disadvantages which may produce grave and widespread consequences, viz. the unrestricted hiring of labor and export of food supplies from China. In the meantime, the hiring of labor for work in France is prohibited by the Chinese Government, and only a few laborers have gone there. But, as soon as China joins the war, she will be under obligation to hire laborers for the Allies and will be unable to continue the prohibition. So far, only less than 20,000 Chinese laborers have left for France and the sinking of each labor-carrying ship must have claimed a toll of several hundreds. In these circumstances it may be easily conceived what will happen to the laborers that may be sent to Europe in the future. Even though such men may escape death during their voyage, the case of the Chinese workmen in Russia furnishes a serious warning against sending them abroad. England and France may not have the intention to hire labor from China, but the fact remains that many of those proceeding to Europe have already met with ill-fate.

As to the exportation of foodstuffs, it will have the certain effect of increasing the prices of rice and wheat in the interior. With a sudden advance in the prices of foodstuffs and no corresponding increase of income the poor masses will shortly find themselves on the verge of starvation. Famine does not always mean that the entire food production of a country is insufficient for the consumption of its entire population. When scarcity is felt in one locality and no supplies can be brought speedily enough for its relief owing to the lack of transport facilities, famine takes place at once. Needless to say, it is not worth-while to starve the entire population of China for the sake of less than \$200,000,000, made up of a loan amounting to \$100,000,000, indemnity funds amounting to \$30,000,000 and increase of revenue amounting to about \$50,000,000.

Moreover, the loan and the indemnities under suspension have eventually to be paid not only in full but with interest added. So they cannot be properly considered as benefits. The only thing which may be called a benefit, is the increase of \$50,000,000 in the customs revenue. But, who will bear the burden of the increased customs taxation? The answer is, "the Chinese themselves and not the foreigners." Foreigners will suffer no more than a slight inconvenience in bringing their goods into China, while, the prices and taxes for such commodities will continue to be paid out of Chinese pockets. There are many ways in which the Chinese Government may obtain revenues from its people. Why must it adopt the present line of action, which will send hundreds of thousands of people to face death and cause hunger and poverty to tens of millions? The above analysis shows that the so-called "benefits" are not benefits at all, but will, on the contrary, give rise to infinite trouble.

There is, however, another danger even more serious than the evils which have been described above. That is, national extinction may be the result of our offering ourselves as a sacrifice to Great Britain and France in the desire of gaining of small advantages. In such an event no amount of efforts will save us from disaster. The Chinese people, who are still in a dormant state, may some day awake and find themselves in fetters, and then it will be too late for them to repent.

The present war in Europe is a terrible tragedy. No man with any sympathy for his fellow creatures will point at it as a golden opportunity for China. If, however, China must profit by the war, she can do it in more ways than one. Japan and the United States, for example, have reaped immense profits from the conflict by economic activities. The various countries in Europe are suffering from shortage of manpower and capital as a result of the war. Their workmen have been turned into soldiers and machines are used for the manufacture of military supplies. Necessaries of life have to be sought from abroad, and even the supply of war material is dependent partly upon foreign sources. Under such conditions the industrial and shipping interests of Japan and America are all enjoying a business boom. Owing to unfavorable trade Japan was formerly unable to maintain her financial affairs in a proper condition. She had to look to foreign countries for loans to tide over financial difficulties. It was not until the year before last that her trade balance began to improve by leaps and bounds, causing an influx of gold into the country. Her cash reserves at the

end of last year stood at Y.700,000,000 and are still increasing. The amount of gold which has flowed into America, however, is many times greater than the amount which has flowed into Japan. Japan has joined the war, but has now laid down arms without going through with it, while the United States has only just begun to fight. It is the immunity from the disastrous effects of the war that has helped to bring about the present economic prosperity in both countries.

There is no harm in seeking profit in the same way as Japan and America have done. Such neutral countries as Holland, Switzerland, Spain and Denmark are situated too near to the battlefield to escape the adverse effects on their trade. The Anglo-French blockade has almost completely ruined the trade of the Scandinavian countries and Holland. Only the various countries in America and Asia are in a position to achieve prosperity at the present time. If China wants to promote her own interests, she must maintain neutrality and at the same time develop herself economically to make up for the losses she has suffered in the past and pave the way for her future greatness. This is quite simple, and the wonder is why nobody has ever thought of it. Declaration of war in the vain hope of obtaining a few unobtainable benefits will only bring disastrous consequences to China. It is fervently hoped that all Chinese people will devote their attention to this vital national problem.

Natural resources, manpower and capital are the three main factors in economic development. In planning the development of China today there is no fear of a lack of natural resources or manpower; the only thing needed is capital. The territory of China is vast, but large tracts remain uncultivated and the population is so numerous that many people are out of employment. If she knows how to utilize her land and population she could have become rich within a brief space of time. Her inexhaustible resources and manpower, if aided by a little capital, would transform China into the richest and consequently the strongest country of the world, even without the help of up-to-date machinery. It should be quite easy to secure a little capital from abroad. Since the opening of hostilities the belligerent countries in Europe have been concentrating their efforts on the production of necessities and consequently the output of those commodities which they export to China has greatly diminished. At the same time, the cost of transportation has increased considerably.

This is, indeed, an opportunity for China to develop her agriculture and industry. Chinese agriculture is already highly developed; what she needs to do is to impart some new knowledge to her farmers and to introduce an efficient governmental control over agricultural production. Proper management will exclude the use of wasteful methods and no crisis will occur in the areas which are now suffering more or less from food scarcity. As long as no restrictions are placed on the export of foodstuffs, foreign countries will continue to offer high prices for the purchase of cereals only from the localities favored with transport facilities. With the continued soaring of the price of cereals, starvation is inevitable. Under systematic agricultural control, areas with an over-production will be able to export their surplus for the relief of areas suffering from under-production. It is even possible that China's production of cereals will be more than sufficient for the needs of the whole country. The export of cereals should give rise to no difficulties, provided that systematic action is taken to regulate the movement of foodstuffs. The same consideration applies to agricultural produce other than foodstuffs. If proper reforms are introduced to rehabilitate agriculture, a great increase in exports will follow as a natural consequence.

Will not such a plan yield immense beneficial results? The people who are supposed at present to be promoting industry have, however, not set themselves to work along such lines. On the contrary, they have imposed such exorbitant taxes on the rural population that agriculture is more or less paralyzed. In some regions huge quantities of crops are allowed to go to rot, while the inhabitants in other regions are in the grip of famine, pining for relief. This is precisely what is meant by the phrase, "the erection of barriers is detrimental to the people."

Take the mining industry as another example. Since the enactment of the Mining Law applicants for permission to open mines have had to go through innumerable difficulties before they can obtain a permit. Sometimes after permission has been obtained, it transpires that a mine has been encroached upon, and a bribe has to be paid to rid it of the encroachment. It often happens that before securing the right to exploit a mine one has to spend several tens of thousands of dollars. Consequently, there is even less prospecting now than before the introduction of the Mining Law. The mining laws of other countries are intended for the protection of mining interests, whereas the Mining Law of our country is

designed to throttle them. Although the Chinese people engaged in mining in the South Sea Islands find themselves unhappily under the power of Europeans and are subject to discriminatory treatment, they can nevertheless carry on their business quite profitably. As soon as they return to their Fatherland and read the Chinese Mining Law with a view to exploiting natural resources, all their hopes are shattered and there is nothing for them to do but to go back to where they came from. It appears that the mining regulations made by foreigners to impose hardships on Chinese residents are far better than the Mining Law made by China in favor of overseas Chinese. No wonder that the mining industry in China remains in a backward state.

The same may be said of all the other Chinese industrial and commercial enterprises. When a foreign Government creates a particular Ministry, it is aimed at protecting the interests of its people, but when the Chinese Government creates one, it is directed against China's own interests. Such being the case, can it not be said that there is no chance for China to become rich and strong? If we would follow the footsteps of the West and clear away the obstacles that stand in the way of our industry and commerce, even though we might accomplish a mere fraction of what the Europeans have achieved, we could transform our country into the richest and strongest State in the world. Take Germany, for example. At the commencement of the war, she was suffering constantly from acute shortage of food-stuffs and other commodities, but, later, after the introduction of systematic control, she began to enjoy an abundance of supplies. She had spent the bulk of her national resources on the war, and yet, by using properly the remainder of her wealth, she managed successfully to ameliorate the situation. We have far greater natural resources and man-power than Germany, and, what is even more important is that there is no war within our country.

At this moment, when the world market is wide open to us, suffering from lack of supplies, there is no doubt about the possibility of China realizing large profits. The most serious obstacles that stand in the way of Chinese industry today are the unreasonable Government regulations and conditions of *likin*, and innumerable other taxes of an exorbitant nature. All these things can be abolished within a brief space of time. Another noteworthy fact is that since the opening of the war American shipping interests have gained enormous profits despite constant

sinking of their vessels. The majority of the *nouveau riches* in Japan have made their fortunes from the shipping trade. Last year the Nippon Yusen Kaisha alone reaped profits amounting to several tens of millions of yen. Although the gains of this single company may not be taken as reflecting the prosperity of the country as a whole, it is a fact that the smooth operation of the Japanese shipping trade has brought prosperity to every business and fortunes to many households in that country.

In contrast, the transportation business in China is in a lamentable condition. Since the outbreak of hostilities it often happened that as many as 30,000 tons of goods were accumulated and held up in Shanghai owing to the lack of transport facilities. What is the amount of interest payable on the value of 30,000 tons of goods? What is the amount of go-down charges? Such losses probably total several millions of dollars per annum. When 30,000 tons are held up in Shanghai, the tonnage held up in various interior ports must be ten times this figure, and the losses probably amount to several tens of millions of dollars per annum. When goods are stranded in interior ports, it may be imagined that in the producing areas there are still less facilities for the export of their products, which must be in a state of deterioration. The loss incurred consists not only in the payment of interest but also in the reduction of capital. Thus the total losses probably amount to several hundreds of millions of dollars per annum.

If a reform is brought about in the Chinese national economy, the effects will be as beneficial as, if not more beneficial than, any which may accrue from the "conditions of entry into the war." The foreign loan, the indemnity payments and tariff increase can amount to no more than \$200,000,000, whereas the increase of revenue which will result from a thorough-going reform will be greater than this figure. The so-called "conditions" are only temporary palliatives, because the increased income will have to be repaid within a short time, whereas the suggested reform will bring about a real increase of wealth without causing any harm whatever.

If China is really serious on furthering her own interests, why does she not prefer the methods suggested to the procedure now being followed? At this moment there is a shortage of shipping facilities. Chinese labor is cheaper than labor in other countries and it is quite easy to import machinery and iron material for the construction of ships. To meet the

present emergency ready-made vessels may be purchased, even at comparatively high prices, to expedite the transportation of goods. The total amount of goods now being tied up are estimated at 300,000 tons, most of which are destined for adjacent localities. If a round trip can be made each month, the 300,000 tons of goods can be cleared off in a year. Only 40,000 tons of shipping will be sufficient for the purpose. Such a plan is not absolutely impossible of realization. The 40,000 tons of shipping may be used simultaneously for the export of surplus agricultural produce and for the import of necessary commodities. At the same time efforts may be made to build a foundation for a new ship-building industry. Thus the goods stranded in various interior ports may be cleared off in a year, and the commodities in the producing areas may be moved out gradually in order to prevent rotting. These measures alone will bring about a remarkable economic development. The hiring of the unemployed to perform reclamation work, the abolition of the *likin* restrictions and the encouragement of the shipping business will certainly bring, in one year, far more benefits than those which may accrue from the "conditions of entry into the war," and, moreover, such plan will not involve any risks. The "conditions" on the other hand, will involve risks, and may not bring any benefit at all. After carrying out the measures suggested above, agriculture, mining and other industries will develop, as it were, automatically. Japan has acquired a national wealth of Y.700,000,000 within the space of two years. A comparison between the potential resources of China and those of Japan convinces one that it would not be difficult for China to acquire a national income of \$1,000,000,000 per annum.

The existing Chinese Government is worried about its financial situation, not knowing that financial resources are dependent on the national economy. It makes no effort to improve the national economy, and, instead, devotes itself to the pursuit of immediate advantages. Even if such advantages were obtained, they might ultimately cause the extinction of the nation. If, on the other hand, they were not obtained, infinite trouble would happen nevertheless. Is it thus worth-while to follow the present line of conduct? With such a rare opportunity in hand, is it not absurd deliberately to throw away the chance of economic development? If we can be content with poverty, it is still possible for us gradually to remedy the situation. Spasmodic efforts to gain imaginary advantages will involve the danger of national extinction. The only benefit to the Government will be a foreign

loan, if it can be obtained at all. Instead of compromising the interests of the whole nation, would it not be better for the Government to work in the same spirit to reform the domestic politics, to promote industry and agriculture, and to facilitate communications? Would not such a program bring more real advantages and involve less danger to the country? We cannot believe that the authorities are so blind as not to see this. The defiance of public opinion, the renunciation of long-cherished policy and the embarking upon a hazardous action, lead one to suspect that in deciding upon the present policy the authorities have been considering their own interests without any regard for the national welfare.

We are fully aware that a part of the Government authorities have a true and ardent desire to save the nation. They are pursuing the present policy in the hope of improving China's place in the family of nations. Even among officials of the old type, who are generally understood to be governed in their behavior by nothing else but considerations of private interests, there are not a few who, in advocating China's entry into the war, are motivated, not by private interests, but by the desire to make a stand against Japan. With rare exceptions, all the advocates of entry into the war are laboring under the impression that Japan is trying to establish hegemony in the Far East, and that present policy will restore to China her place in the family of nations and, by joining hands with America, drive out the influence of Japan. Whether the advocates of the war on Germany are motivated by this idea or not, there is no doubt that this idea is ever-present in the minds of the old-type officials. Japan's action in preventing China from entering the war the year before last, has increased the misgivings in these quarters, who seem to think that if Japan does not want China to join the war that step must be injurious to Japan's interests.

From this the conclusion is drawn that since China's entry into the war is injurious to Japan, it must be advantageous to China, and consequently the pro-American decision has been further strengthened. But our overtures to the United States have not been answered, and our opposition to Japan has only had the effect of obliging ourselves to submit to Japan's guidance. It is obvious that those in favor of this policy can never attain their objectives. These people not only have not abandoned their anti-Japanese and pro-American ideas, but expect that the American Navy expansion program will soon be completed, and that then China may, with

the aid of the American Navy, drive the Japanese interests out of her territory.

But the relations between China and Japan are so closely knit together that the full significance of this fact cannot be explained away simply by the phrase "same cul-ture and same race." True unity between one nation and another must necessarily depend upon a community of interests. As China has the same interests as Japan, Japan needs must take care of China's interests and offer her friendly advice. Japanese opposition to the British efforts to induce China to join the war last year is a case in point. Japan must have a certain reason for her opposition, and the reason is neither any conflict between Chinese and Japanese interests nor any design to inflict harm on China in order to benefit herself, The reason is; If China should join the war she would sacrifice herself somehow or other for England, and then either Germany or Russia would reap the benefit of China's sacrifice. If Germany or Russia should control the rights and interests of China, Japan, would have still less room for development than she has at present; in fact, Japan might have even no way to protect herself. This would be harmful to Japan, but her suffering is the result of China's suffering. For although Japanese and Chinese interests have different starting points, they have the same goal. When offering advice to China, Japan has, of course, an eye on her own interests and not on Chinese interests, but the advice cannot for that reason be simply rejected. Those who are now advocating the pro-American policy do not understand the true situation in East Asia.

## Chapter III

### THE ABSURDITY OF CHINA'S PARTICIPATION

The United States has now declared war on Germany. It cannot be predicted, however, whether she will act independently or join the Allies. The declaration of war by the United States is backed up by real force. Leaving aside other factors, the American Navy occupies the third position in the world. After the declaration of war, the American Navy may assume part of the responsibility for scouring the Atlantic waters. While there is no knowing whether the German U-boats are afraid of the American Navy, the fact is that the United States enters the war with the necessary force. According to official reports, the U.S. Navy has a reserve force of 2,000,000 men. While it is not known how many of these men can be put on the field, the possession of such military strength may be taken as proof of the American capacity for prosecuting the war. Moreover, the United States is in the meantime planning to expand her armed power further. The annual increase of the American naval strength often amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars. Since her declaration of war, the United States has, as a first step, decided on an appropriation of over U.S. \$2,900,000,000 for her army and of U.S. \$500,000,000 for her navy.

A nation must possess the necessary strength before she can talk about war. Can China claim to possess even a hundredth of the military strength of the United States? Can China put forth a single dreadnought or submarine against the enemy? Does she have one fully-equipped division? Needless to say, she is not in a position to join the war. Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania are no help to the Allies, and yet they have each put more than 100,000 men on the field. Even when defeated, these men can still fight valiantly. Can China, in fighting with Germany, achieve one-tenth of what these countries have achieved? China has not one-hundredth part of the strength of the United States or one-tenth part of the strength of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro or Rumania, with which to back up the rupture of relations with Germany and her declaration of war. To humiliate a handful of Germans remaining in China and then to pretend to have scored a victory is not only dangerous but also disgraceful and ridiculous. Many stupid fools contend that declaration of war does not necessarily require actual fighting. If this were true, then war is just a big joke!

The principal cause of the American declaration of war on Germany is the condition of American industry. Since the outbreak of hostilities, Britain and France have been suffering acutely from lack of war materials, and at the same time have had to furnish Russia and Italy with military supplies. Consequently, they have been obliged to seek help from America. In response to Allied appeals the United States has expanded her industries and devoted herself to the production of military supplies, the export of which has as a result increased enormously. The over-abundance of gold which results from the increase of exports is a cause of anxiety to the American nation. The total value of the export to Europe last year was U.S. \$3,750,000,000 (equivalent to \$7,500,000,000 in Chinese silver currency). Some of the export items have increased in volume to several times the former figures; and some, like copper, iron, foodstuffs and gunpowder, had increased by hundreds of per cent. The United States official figures, as published in a Russian chronicle, are shown in the Table as follows:

Table of U.S. Staple Exports During Recent Years  
(Unit in Francs)

Name of Commodity	3rd Year of Chinese Republic 1914	4th and 5th Year of Chinese Republic 1915-16
cattle	23,000,000	494,000,000
Copper	295,000,000	1,285,000,000
foodstuffs	825,000,000	2,175,000,000
aeroplanes and metal parts	1,130,000,000	35,000,000
motor cars	165,000,000	600,000,000
motorcycles and trucks	250,000,000	835,000,000
chemicals	137,000,000	620,000,000
explosives	30,000,000	2,335,000,000
iron, steel, aluminum and lead	1,257,000,000	3,330,000,000
pistols	17,000,000	90,000,000
machines and lathes	70,000,000	305,000,000
metal cords, nails	51,500,000	250,000,000
raw and tanned leather	182,000,000	400,000,000
footwear and hosiery	90,000,000	235,000,000
condensed milk	6,500,000	60,000,000
refined sugar	9,000,000	395,000,000
wool	34,000,000	225,000,000

The sharp increase of American exports signifies on the one hand an influx of money and on the other hand the concentration of capital on

certain lines of industrial activity. A large part of the increased export items as shown in the Table are the output of newly established industrial plants. As such plants have been established with enormous capital, any interruption of exports will put diem out of work and at once cause a panic. It is precisely for this reason that, when Germany offered to negotiate peace, the American market received a rude shock. It may be conjectured what effects may be suffered by America from the German policy of submarine blockade. In pre-war days, the United States enjoyed a prosperous trade with Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Since the British blockade of German ports, America has lost a part of the world market. Fortunately, the British, French, Italian and Russian demand for American goods is more than enough to compensate for the loss.

Under such circumstances America sees the bright but not the gloomy side of war. But since the German declaration of the intention to sink without warning all ships in the blockade zones, the United States and other neutral countries have been alarmed by the prospect of having to suspend their shipping trade, and the American industries have been in a state of serious nervousness. Therefore, the United States hopes to break the submarine power of Germany in order to protect her own interests and continue her trade. This is the chief intention underlying the American declaration of war. But it is open to doubt whether America's participation in the war will have the desired effect of wiping out German submarines. It is not improbable that this doubt is also entertained by American industrial interests. If the United States, in strengthening her armed might, has all along had the intention of declaring war, she can now turn the supplies originally intended for foreign countries to the reinforcing of her own power, and incidentally this will help to eliminate the trouble of faulty investment and overproduction. Thus, even if the German submarines should continue their deadly activities and the American trade to Europe should be cut off, the American capitalists would still not have to worry about their interests. That is why the entire American nation is clamoring for war.

Does the same condition of things exist in China? Since the outbreak of the European conflict, China's trade with America and Japan has undergone no change, while her trade with Europe has been decreasing continually. The decrease is largely due to the fact that the Chinese Government takes no notice of trade affairs, and the Chinese people are too



ignorant. But the principal cause of the decrease lies in the fact that Chinese products are not in urgent demand in European countries. Furthermore, the restrictions recently imposed by England and France on imports into their countries are particularly unfavorable to China. Owing to these restrictions, China's export of silk, tea and other commodities is seriously handicapped, while China's agriculture and commerce are also adversely affected. The United States is suffering from the German blockade, while China is suffering from the British and French embargo on imports.

Thus, the United States and China are in different circumstances; they are suffering differently from the actions of the belligerent countries. If China, however, really wants to adopt the same line of action as America, should she not, first of all, protest to England and France against the import restrictions, and then follow it up with rupture of relations, and declaration of war? China stands in a position different from that of the United States. As far as China is concerned, strict observance of neutrality is the way to further her own interests and to preserve her own existence.

Moreover, the recent American entry into the war was a step forced upon the United States by Germany. Until recently, America has been supplying various European countries with unlimited quantities of war material, and this fact has been taken by Germany as an indication that the United States has not been pursuing a policy of armament expansion. Hence the German challenge to the United States. The United States cannot be so unprepared as China for entry into the war; all she has to do to strengthen her own army and navy is to stop the supply of arms and ammunition to the Allied countries. The war expenditure of U.S. \$3,400,000,000 recently approved by the American Congress is not far from the total value of American exports to Europe during last year. Therefore, at the end of the year when this amount has been expended, American exports of war supplies to Europe will fall to less than one-tenth of the exports during the year before last, and the Allied supplies will be exhausted. The opinion is current that the United States is so wealthy and so strong that she should prove a deadly enemy to Germany. As a matter of fact, the combined naval strength of the American and Allied fleets will never achieve the feat of wiping out the German submarines, and the transportation of several hundreds of thousands of American troops to Europe is a stupendous undertaking. Assuming, however, that the United States will succeed in landing such an expeditionary force on the European

Continent, it will have no more effect on the war situation than what British reinforcements have produced. Besides, the transport of supplies and reinforcements will necessitate the requisitioning of a large number of vessels, which will aggravate the food shortage in the British Isles.

It is plain, therefore, that the advantages of America's entry into the war cannot be offset by the disadvantages, and it is just because Germany understands this so well that she has been using every means in her power to bring the United States into the war. The United States has never seriously wanted to join the war. The American President's proposal for the negotiation of peace before the decisive battle indicates that in his heart of hearts he does not want the United States to join the war. The United States Government in a Note to Germany declares that it is not only the right but also the obligation of the United States to offer its mediatory services. Three weeks later, the United States suddenly lodged a protest, broke off relations and finally declared war. Probably, even Dr. Wilson himself could not foresee that things would turn out as they did. Because the American entry into the war is advantageous to Germany, she has forced the United States to take such a step. But China is under no necessity to join the war. Why must she follow the footsteps of the United States? She gives one the impression of an ugly woman aping the ways of the beautiful queen!

China's position is in absolute contrast with the position of the United States. The United States has a powerful army and navy, whereas China has none. The United States has suffered at the hands of Germany, whereas China has suffered from the Allied countries. The United States is compelled to join the war, while China has no such necessity. Why in the name of Heaven is China so desirous of getting herself into trouble? Not long ago Japan exerted her utmost to build up a sphere of influence in Shantung and the South Sea Islands, but she secured what she wanted and she has taken every care to keep it without embarking on any further adventures. The year before last, a suggestion was made to invite Japan to send troops to the Balkans. The suggestion had the unanimous support of the various European Powers and for a moment appeared attractive even to a minority of the Japanese themselves, but in the face of opposition from the majority, the idea had to be dropped. Japan's relations with the Allied countries are very different from China's relations with them, and, what is more, Japan is strong enough to prosecute a war. Despite this fact, she has not accepted the suggestion offered by the Powers, as she does not want to defy the opposition of the entire nation. Instead of babbling about following

the example of the United States, why does not the Chinese Government think more carefully over the matter?

## Chapter IV

### CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE POWERS

China is contemplating entry into the war with the desire of pleasing the European Powers and the United States in anticipation of their support. Such an idea is perfectly in line with her traditional, stupid policy of "befriending the far and attacking the near." In fact, the policy of playing one foreign country against another has been popular ever since China's first contact with foreigners. Unfortunately, the policy of playing Russia against Japan, regarded by Li Hung-chang as the key to diplomatic success, ultimately led to invasion by foreign Powers. Thus, such ideas as the partition of China and her division into spheres of influence were suggested, and treaties were signed for the cession or lease of various territories. Such were the results of this policy!

Nevertheless, Li's policy has been regarded as a model, to be admired and followed, by the old-fashioned government officials who had only the vaguest ideas about diplomacy. Yuan Shih-kai laid down the principle of diplomacy as being the "bringing of the influence of one country into the sphere of influence of another country so as to cause a clash of interests." His policy was essentially the same as Li's policy of playing one foreign country off against the other and "attacking the neighbor with friends from a distance." The present authorities are following Yuan's policy of playing America off against Japan. While it is true that the United States has persuaded China to lodge a protest with Germany, the American Minister has declared that the matter of joining the war would be left to China's own decision. Japan at first objected to China's participation in the war, but since China lodged the protest in compliance with the advice of the United States, Japan has changed her attitude and has been urging China to join the conflict on the side of the Allies.

In other words, there have been some intrigues between Japan and America behind China's policy towards Germany. Does the Chinese Government think it better to adopt a pro-Japanese, instead of a pro-American, policy despite the fact that America's suggestions are more convincing than Japan's? No, it does not. The old-fashioned Chinese officials are pro-American, but the time is still not ripe for them to carry out their policy. China obeys Japan because she has at present no alternative

but to wait for the day when she may obtain foreign assistance to avenge the injuries which she has suffered at the hands of Japan. The Chinese Government is eager to make concessions to Tokyo but its gift is in the nature of a Greek gift; the humbler it appears, the more treacherous it is to Japan.

We cannot say that there is any lack of sincerity in such pro-American attitude, but we may safely affirm that China will never be benefited by such a chimerical policy. It is the shortsightedness of the Japanese statesmen and Britain's pressure on China that have given rise to all the talk about China's severance of relations and entry into the war. While seven of the Allied countries are said to be persuading China to enter the war, it must be pointed out that Italy, Belgium, and Portugal were at first not interested in the question of China's participation. (In view of the possibility that China may be called upon to share the burdens of the Allies after the war is over, Italy, Belgium and Portugal may have been directly interested in the question, but their interest cannot be very serious.) What France and Russia expect to derive from China's participation in the war can be easily obtained even without China's participation. The only country which seriously desires China's entry into the war is Great Britain; Japan is urging China to enter because she has no alternative; the United States only wants us to adopt the same attitude as her own; the other countries are not seriously concerned with the question.

The Allies, it is said, expect to derive the following benefits from China's participating in the war, namely, (1) supply of manpower, (2) supply of foodstuffs, (3) exclusion of German economic interests from China. A study of the situation however convinces us that the above three points are merely a pretext adopted by the Chinese advocates of war in a moment of self-hallucination, and can-not be accepted even by the Allies themselves as the true reasons for their insistence on China's participation.

First, let us deal with the German economic interests in China. Germany's trade with China has been completely disrupted since the outbreak of war, and Tsingtao, the only German trade center in the East, is now in Japanese hands. The German trade is now represented by only a few scores of mercantile establishments which have completely suspended their business. If you consider the closure of several schools, the arrest of a few armed guards, the closure of a small number of mercantile houses and the

dismissal of a couple of German employees from Chinese Government service as a success in eliminating German influence, would you not consider the capture of Tsingtao and the cutting off of German trade as much greater achievements? Japan has failed to wipe out German influence completely from the East in spite of the fact that she has spent millions of dollars on a campaign lasting several months with casualties reaching nearly 1,000; is it not ridiculous and childish to expect that a few Chinese policemen and officials can succeed where Japan has failed?

German predominance over the China market may be ascribed to the following three factors: (1) high quality of her commodities, (2) observance of commercial ethics, and (3) thorough knowledge of the Chinese psychology. In these three matters Germany is superior to any other country. It is by virtue of these three qualities that Germany, who came into the China market later than her competitors and lacked any base for her economic operations, managed within a brief space of time to push herself into the British sphere of influence, and to gain the upper hand. The German extension of influence could not be checked by human efforts. A survey of the German import and export situation in China after her occupation of Tsingtao reveals that the German economic base in the East is not in that port.

Exports and Imports at Tsingtao During 1911

<i>(Unit in Taels)</i>			
Name of Country	Value of Imports	Value of Exports	Total
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Germany	4,665,000	1,596,000	6,261,000
Japan	4,309,000	1,174,000	5,483,000
Britain	8,000	4,329,000	4,337,000
France	199,000	1,551,000	1,750,000
America	1,282,000	124,000	1,406,000

It is impossible to exterminate the German trade by occupying Tsingtao. Nor will there be any way to stop the inflow of her merchandise after the conclusion of the war. Once she resumes her trade with China, she will find it quite easy to recover her former position or even improve on it by virtue of the qualities enumerated above. Therefore, the restrictions imposed on her trade can be regarded only as a temporary measure, which is indeed quite unnecessary in view of the fact that her trade has already ceased completely. In this light the claim that the Allies are desirous of cutting off German trade is absolutely untenable.

Speaking of manpower, it may be pointed out that the countries which really stand in need of such assistance are only Russia and France. Great Britain, though known to have only a small population in her own territory, is probably not at all concerned over the shortage of manpower, inasmuch as she has at her disposal the entire population of 300,000,000 in India. In addition, there are plenty of Chinese laborers in the British colonies. It should not be difficult to enlist hundreds of thousands of laborers, say, from Malaya, Borneo and Burma within a fortnight or so. Besides, Chinese immigrants are continuously pouring into the Straits Settlement with the object of earning a living, and they constitute an inexhaustible source of manpower. It is quite easy for Russia and France to conclude a special agreement with China for this supply of Chinese labor, and the fact that these two countries have long been enlisting Chinese labor without having concluded any such agreement, is ample proof that the question of manpower is not a true reason for urging China to join the war.

Let us now turn to the question of foodstuffs. The shortage of food in Russia is not due to underproduction, but to the lack of transport facilities. Since her transport facilities are insufficient even for the transportation of foodstuffs from one place to the other within her own territory, how can she expect to bring any food supplies into her land from a foreign country? It is true that Britain is suffering from underproduction of grain, but it is far more convenient for her to obtain her supplies from America and Canada than from China. China has for a long time been importing flour in large quantities from abroad. If the flour which has already been imported into China, and all the future imports of flour and what are handed over to the British, the British will have enough food for their consumption. There is no necessity for China to declare war. Supplies of rice for Fukien and Kwangtung have always been drawn from Annam

and Burma, and, if Britain and France are in need of food, they can obtain large quantities of rice from these colonies, instead of from China. Judging from every angle, we are convinced that the question of manpower and food are not the true reasons for the Allies' efforts to persuade China to join the war. Japan, Great Britain, and America, therefore, are the only countries which are closely concerned with, and anxious to secure, China's entry into the war.

In the present efforts to induce China to join the conflict, the United States and Japan are in the limelight while Great Britain remains in the background. As a matter of fact, however, Britain is playing the leading role. The United States and Japan are being used as tools by Great Britain, who has tried for a long time to bring China into the war. At the time when Yuan Shih-kai proclaimed himself Emperor of China, Britain offered to extend recognition to his monarchy on condition that China would enter the war, but in the face of Japan's opposition the offer had to be withdrawn before Yuan could reach a decision. Britain has since never ceased her efforts in this direction. But the British Government has already promised the Japanese Foreign Minister, Viscount Ishii, that before taking any action in China, Britain would always first consult Japan. In this light, the hands of British diplomats are tied in the Extreme Orient.

Therefore, if Britain desires to induce China to join the war, she must first obtain Japan's consent, and in order to obtain Japan's consent, she must get the United States to use her influence in China. We cannot ascertain the real motives of the United States in this matter, but Mr. Simpson, the Editor of the *Peking Gazette*, and his crowd, appear to think that after protesting to Germany China can rely upon America's economic and military power to counter-balance any pressure that Japan may exert on China. This view indicates that the Chinese Government is pro-American and anti-Japanese, and that at the same time Britain entertains a bitter feeling against Japan. It is a favorite idea among the pro-American advocates that Japan's purpose in preventing China from joining the war until this year, was to control the Chinese diplomatic policy and that the recent protest to Germany had been lodged by China with the object of maintaining her diplomatic independence. But it is Britain whose diplomatic policy in the Far East is subject to Japan's control and who cannot recover her diplomatic independence until China has entered the war. How can China achieve diplomatic independence?

The old-fashioned mandarins have the habit of suspecting everybody of being a malicious scoundrel unless he is bent on promoting his own private interests. Japan's objection to China's participation in the war might be partly due to the unwillingness on the part of the Japanese Prime Minister Count Okuma to recognize Yuan's regime, but this was certainly not the principal reason. The chief reason was the fear that China might be placed in a dis-advantageous position as a result of her participation. Commenting candidly on Japan's attitude at that moment, we may say that she placed China's interests even before her own. (It is unnecessary to point out that in the present situation China and Japan have common interests.) Instead of showing gratitude towards Japan for her kindness in saving China from danger, some Chinese officials have expressed the opinion that the Japanese have been attempting to deprive China of her diplomatic freedom. These officials, on the other hand, are all clamoring for revenge. Are they all out of their minds? Japan realizes that China's participation in the war will not help the Allies to conquer Germany, but will only result in the immolation of China even in case of Allied victory. *If China is sacrificed, not only China, but Japan also will suffer.* Japan, in trying to avert such a danger at the risk of offending her Allies, has by no means done China any wrong. Yet some people persist in saying that Japan is oppressing China and trying to deprive her of her diplomatic freedom. This is why they lost the opportunity of co-operating with Japan in developing East Asia, and played into the hands of the White peoples.

Yuan's satellites had built the wildest dreams on their leader's coronation, and his failure filled them with mixed feelings of shame and anger which they found convenient to vent on Japan. It is often said that the Twenty-One Demands presented by Japan are indicative of her desire to monopolize China's interests and to carry out territorial designs, but it must be understood that the Demands were drawn up not at Japan's dictation. It is known that in his eagerness to mount the Throne, Yuan once offered to Japan some benefits even greater than those contained in the Fifth Group, but the offer was refused. After the dissolution of Parliament and the revision of the Constitution, China expected to obtain a second foreign loan, but at that juncture war broke out in Europe, and shattered all hopes of such a loan. Yuan then abandoned his anti-Japanese attitude and became friendly to Japan. Desiring Japan's recognition of his monarchy, he promised her certain advantages in return. In fact, the Twenty-One

Demands were presented by Japan at his own instigation; Japan did not, at the beginning, press him to accept those Demands.

Subsequently, however, in view of the strong anti-Japanese attitude adopted by Yuan in the past and realizing that he would hit back with increased vigor when everything was settled, Japan decided to exact important advantages from him in the hope of preventing future trouble. Somehow the matter leaked out and met not only with opposition from the Chinese public, but with adverse criticism from various other countries. Nevertheless, Yuan went on with the execution of his scheme and secretly asked the Japanese to dispatch troops and send an ultimatum to China in order to subdue the opposition of the Chinese people and thus facilitate his acceptance of the Demands. However, he never had the courage to accept the Fifth Group. After the lapse of six months when he ascended the Throne, a revolution broke out in Yunnan. With all speed Yuan deputed Chow Tze-chi as a special emissary to inform Japan that in spite of public opposition he would not only accept the Fifth Group but would give Japan some other advantages in the bargain.

It would have been quite easy for Japan at that time to help Yuan to suppress the Kuomintang and to obtain advantages for herself, but the entire Japanese nation, being proof against such temptation, rose in opposition to Yuan's request, and consequently Yuan's scheme proved a failure. By comparison, it appears that Japan's aim in China is not necessarily aggressive; her actions have more often than not proved beneficial to China. It is wrong therefore to accuse Japan of harboring wild ambitions. In opposing China's entry into the war and in rejecting Yuan's offer as conveyed by Chow Tze-chi, Japan was actuated by a pure sense of righteousness. While we cannot fully endorse the actions of Count Okuma, we must not be unfair to Japan.

Even now, when Japan has suddenly changed her attitude and is persuading China to enter the war, we are convinced that among the Japanese people there must be some who have weighed the advantages and disadvantages of China's entry and who do not want China to be involved in the European imbroglio. Japan's hesitation in agreeing to the so-called "conditions of China's entry into the war" may be explained by the fact that being an Ally of Britain she cannot continue indefinitely to refuse the British request, but at the same time she does not want to be responsible for

any consequences that may arise from China's entry on the side of the Allies. Accordingly, Japan is coaxing China to join the war without offering her any bribe. (The "conditions of China's entry into the war" such as revision of customs tariff and moratorium on indemnity payments, are tantamount to a bribe.)

Japan is certainly not unaware of the existence of the principle of equal share of privileges, which entitles her to equal benefits after the termination of the conflict; and whatever she may concede to China at present may" be withdrawn without any damage either to her prestige or her material interests. It is solely due to her unwillingness to see China embark upon a dangerous course that she strongly objects to the "conditions of China's entry into the war." She is above the reproach of conscience. If China should perish as a result of her participation in the war, Japan will suffer or perish with her, so Japan does not really want China to participate. (The diplomatic secrets exposed above have been obtained from absolutely reliable sources, which, however, cannot be revealed for reasons of responsibility. At any rate, the authorities themselves know that the above statements are true and that nothing has been added or detracted from the facts to suit my own convenience. Upon my honor and according to my conscience, I swear that the above statements are absolutely reliable.)

Will the United States herself be benefited by China's entry into the war or not? The answer to this question is: In persuading China to act in concert with herself, the United States hopes that other neutral countries will also follow her example. It is far from her desire to satisfy her own ends by inducing China or any other neutral countries to enter the war. It will be recalled that at the time when the United States sent a Note to persuade China to lodge a protest with Germany, she dispatched identical Notes to all other neutral countries, as she had done on a previous occasion when she made an appeal for peace. In view of America's advice to China to lodge a protest, political observers have expressed the opinion that China's entry into the War on the side of the Allies will be welcome to the United States, but these people do not know that the United States, being the leader of the neutrals, desires the other neutrals to act in unison with her only in order to preserve the interests of the neutrals as a whole.

China is not the only country which has been asked to intervene for peace and lodge a protest. The American diplomatic authorities have

certainly taken the right steps, which unfortunately have been misconstrued in the interested quarters. First, the American peace appeal was strongly opposed, and then the American exhortation to lodge a protest was regarded as an opportunity of opposing Japan. I am convinced that America in addressing the Note to China did not cherish the intention of opposing Japan. The American advice to China has only served to excite the imagination and emotions of the old-fashioned mandarins obsessed by the anti-Japanese idea. The attitude of these officials' is exactly what is wanted by the British, and has produced repercussions unexpected by America. If China acts in concert with the United States, she would, of course, please the latter whose only desire, however, is to protect, by concerted action, the interest of the neutrals. The United States wants no more than this. Although she has persuaded China to lodge a protest, she cannot be held responsible for China's entry into the war.

To sum up, neither the United States which has persuaded us to lodge a protest, nor Japan which is advising China to join the war, can derive any benefit from China's participation in the conflict. Even the Allies themselves have no absolute necessity of China's participation on their side. Why, then, have the diplomatic representatives of the seven countries repeatedly interfered with the so-called "China's independent diplomatic policy towards Germany"? The fact is that Britain is the moving spirit and has been doing everything possible to plunge China into the conflict. Yuan Shih-kai's ascension to the Throne afforded Britain an opportunity, but unfortunately for Britain the British efforts have failed as a result of Japan's intervention. Britain then seized upon the American advice to China as an opportunity to stir up anti-Japanese feeling in China so that Japan might be forced to come to a decision favorable to the British policy. We have seen very clearly what the British have been trying to do in the past few years. Judging from the avowals made by Morrison, Simpson, etc., indicating the British efforts to induce China to enter the conflict, it is apparent that the country which will benefit from China's entry is not Portugal, Russia, France, America or Japan, but Britain and Britain alone.

The question may now be asked, "Besides the desire for the supply of foodstuffs and labor and the ruination of German economic interests, does Britain have any other serious reason for urging China to enter the war?" The answer is "Yes." For centuries Britain has followed unswervingly a certain policy, viz. a policy of seeking friends among those

countries which can be sacrificed in order to further her own interests. China is suited to satisfy this purpose, and that is why Britain wants her for an ally.

## Chapter V

### THE FOUNDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

As admitted by the British themselves, Great Britain without India would be classed only as a third-rate Power.

What is the foundation of the British Empire? What has made the London market the center of the world? Why is British diplomacy respected by the whole world and regarded as omnipotent? What has made it possible for the three Isles in the northwest of Europe to control so much territory all over the globe and to boast that the sun never sets under the Union Jack? By what magic has England maintained her dominant position?

This magic power does not lie in her Parliamentary system, nor in the policy of maintaining a navy equal to the combined navies of any two Powers, nor in her Teutonic spirit and her gentlemanly tradition, but in the possession of India. It is the possession of India that enables Britain to control such a vast extent of colonial land all over the globe. It is India that has made London the center of the world market. It is India also that enables Britain to occupy the leading position in Europe and to do whatever she likes in the world in the name of the King of England, generally known as "King of the United Kingdom and Emperor of India." Thus, the British Empire does not depend on England but on India.

The idea of a reciprocal customs tariff for British colonies, advocated by the late Colonial Minister Joseph Chamberlain and his Unionist Party as the first step of an Imperialist program, is significant in this connection. Britain has colonies on all the five Continents. Setting off from the South of England itself, a large part of the African Continent is occupied by Britain with Egypt as the center of communications, and Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden as connecting links. Another center of secondary importance is the Cape of Good Hope. The Red Sea leads eastward to India which is the cream of British colonial possessions. Farther east, Great Britain has the Malayan Peninsula with Singapore as its chief center and Ceylon and Hong Kong as secondary centers. Then there is also Australia to the southeast of the Malayan Peninsula and Canada across the Pacific Ocean.

Her methods of colonial administration vary according to place. Canada and Australia are both enjoying self-government although they are recognized by foreign countries as subject to British sovereignty. Allegiance to England is avowed by Australia and Canada, not for the benefit of the mother country but because they realize that if they were divorced from England, their naval and military expenditures would increase considerably, and that their taxes, which are now quite light, would have also to be increased. In preferring to remain as British Dominions, these two countries have no other object than securing themselves against the outside world. England therefore cannot depend on them for the supply of all necessary supplies. In proclaiming conscription and compulsory labor service," England cannot compel Australia and Canada to comply with her orders. (In November last year, for example, the Australian people voted against the Conscription Law.)

Although the British possessions in Africa are very extensive, they are scattered and the population is comparatively sparse. It is impossible to use these territories as bases for expansion. India and Malaya are more conveniently situated and the British have always been able to do whatever they please in their rule over these two colonies. For this reason, India and Malaya afford ideal bases for the union of the British Empire. The consuming and productive power of the Malayan Peninsula is far smaller than that of India, so India is preferred to Malaya. Chamberlain's policy was to raise the British taxation on imports from foreign countries and to remit taxes on commodities transported from one place to another within the British Empire, as a means of encouraging imperial trade. This exemption of taxation is referred to as Imperial Preference. 'As a result of Imperial Preference, Australian agricultural produce and Indian and Malayan raw materials would be able to dominate the home market, to the exclusion of foreign imports. At the same time, home manufacturers would be able to command the big market composed of Canada, Australia, Africa, etc., to the exclusion of foreign imports. If this policy were successfully carried out, the agriculture, industry and commerce throughout the British Empire would be economically self-contained, and surplus resources could be used in attempts to control the world market. Essential supplies need not be sought from places outside of the Empire. This is implied in the principle of the "Trinity of agriculture, industry, and commerce." It is only after such a policy has been put into execution that British Imperialism can be expected to develop.

European efforts in the past to grab colonial territories may be likened to the scrambling for honey by bees. The sole purpose was to suck the colonial life-blood in order to enrich the mother-countries; it never occurred to the European imperialist to join their different parts into one coherent whole. Colonies were considered only in terms of advantage to the mother countries, and colonial policies were determined according to economic interests. Needless to say, such medieval policy has fallen into desuetude in the 20th century. Hence, Chamberlain's idea of Imperialism. He thinks that a mother country and its colonies should be considered as interdependent parts of a whole, the colonies being the markets for home manufactures and at the same time the sources of agricultural supplies. Yet the importance of such a market depends solely on the size of the colonial population. The entire population in the British Empire is about 400,000,000, among whom 350,000,000 are Indians. The number of British subjects, excluding the British themselves and the Indians, runs into only eight figures, which shows that without India England could never consolidate her Empire.

England's success in securing colonies has been achieved not systematically according to any preconceived program. She seized first a colony in America, and shortly after wrested Canada from France. Presently, the United States declared independence. At the close of the Napoleonic wars, England began to use every means at her disposal to take over the Dutch and Portuguese colonial possessions, and at the same time occupied Australia. It was not until then that she commenced to make some effort to establish connections between the diverse and widely scattered colonies. In the meantime, she occupied the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope, Singapore, etc., as strategic bases.

The exploitation of India was at first undertaken by a chartered company capitalized at only £70,000. In those days this company had to compete not only with the Portuguese pioneers but also with the French and Dutch East India Companies. It happened that the various petty States in India were engaged in civil strife, and were all seeking foreign assistance. Clive, a clerk in the British East India Company, managed by clever maneuvers to worm himself into the confidence of some Indian Princes and supplied them with the sinews of war, while he himself took the opportunity to seize real power. From the 17th century up to the Rebellion of 1857, the administrative power over India was invested entirely in the



said Company; the British Government took no serious interests in the affairs of that country. It was not until after the suppression of the Revolt in 1858 that England announced the annexation of India. In 1877 Queen Victoria assumed the title of "Empress of India" and thereupon the Company gave up to the mother country the control over an area of 1,760,000 sq. miles and a population of over 300,000,000. Since then, the British have used every means in their power to further expand the British Empire, and to protect and maintain their colonial territories.

But the initial conquests were not made according to any preconceived plan. So even in the early years of the 20th century the colonies which should have been regarded as the foundation of the British Empire, were treated as mere accessories to the mother country, and the administrative measures which were undertaken often proved to be at cross-purposes. This is a deplorable feature common to all political units in the first stages of development. Even small units like a city are without any planning; they develop haphazardly until finally they assume irregular shapes. Traffic control becomes a difficult matter; the natural center of the city being remote from the real center, municipal improvements are hampered by all kinds of obstacles. Observers of the world situation may compare such cities as Nanking, Peking, Canton and Hankow in China or such a city as Tokyo in Japan with Washington in the United States, and they will note the difference. Nanking, Canton, Tokyo, etc., have not been intentionally laid out in an irregular shape; they have been left to take the natural course of development so that fields and orchards have grown, as it were, into streets which have become integral parts of the city. In the absence of city planning, irregular growth is inevitable. The same has happened in the case of the British colonies.

As the British colonies have from the very beginning left to take care of themselves, it is now quite difficult to re-coordinate the colonial system. At any rate, it is plain that the economic foundation of Britain, or the source of Britain's life-blood, is in India, and once the foundation is swept off from under its feet, the huge structure of the British Empire will collapse. Without India, England would find the remaining" market of Australia and Canada too small to absorb her manufactured goods; the principle of the "trinity of agriculture, industry and commerce" would never be a reality. Since England would have to look for markets in foreign countries, her policy of self-sufficiency would be completely ruined; the

mother country and the colonies would drift farther and farther apart in their relations until they would become absolutely detached. Hence, without India, Australia and Canada would be useless, and Africa and the Malayan Peninsula less important. Therefore, it is the possession of India that enables England to hold together the British Empire, under whose flag the sun never sets.

That Great Britain is able to dominate the world trade and control the world market is due to her superiority in productive and consuming power, and the fact that production and consumption are carried on in different localities. The inter-colonial commerce and shipping trade are so highly developed as to afford Great Britain sufficient resources with which to compete with her rivals in trade and shipping. The producing and consuming areas for any particular commodity in the world are situated at different distances from London, but, strange as it may seem, the price for that commodity in places far from London is determined on the London market, owing, no doubt, to the complexity of economic and social factors and the concentration of competitive commodities in that metropolis. Although transactions in the world market are reckoned in terms of money, the financial resources of the buyers are created by the sale of some commodities, and the sellers, with the proceeds of their sales, are constantly buying commodities other than those which they deal in. Consequently, the centers where trade is carried on in numerous commodities tend to attract trade in additional commodities. As a result of the concentration of British domestic trade in London, the British foreign trade has become likewise centered in London.

The enormous volume of domestic and foreign trade has brought in its wake transactions in commodities other than those covered by domestic and foreign trades, and, as a natural consequence, London has developed into the nucleus of the world market. Without India, England would lose the major part of her trade and, in consequence of such damage to her basic economic life, she would lose her magnetic power over trade and also her supremacy in the world market. The fate of India is the fate of England. The loss of India would mean the loss of all colonies, of commercial and shipping trades, of the power of self-sufficiency, and of the command over the foreign sources of supply. Would in such an event Britain be able to maintain her present existence?

We have read the history of Spain and Portugal. In the 16th century these two countries divided the world between themselves and each carved out a sphere of influence for itself. Their colonial possessions exceeded in extent the colonial possessions of all the contemporary Powers. It was simply because Portugal and Spain made no efforts to unite their respective dominions into one harmonious whole that no mutual love existed between the mother countries and the colonies, and any suitable opportunity was immediately seized upon as the excuse for a declaration of independence or for a transfer of allegiance to another State. Were not the various areas along the African coast and the Dutch and British possessions in the South Seas at one time under Portuguese domination? Because Portugal did not occupy the Cape of Good Hope, Egypt, etc., there was no way for her to maintain connections between her colonies. Spain, also, failed to build a chain joining her colonies in Central and South America. The result was that at the turn of the 19th century all colonies declared their independence one after the other. In view of the lack of economic ties with the mother country the defection of the colonies was only too natural, and is no matter for surprise.

Following the decline of Portugal, Holland emerged to be for a time dominant in the East. Owing also to the lack of economic unity she lost her position of dominance once the Cape of Good Hope and Malacca fell into the hands of Britain. Had Portugal or Holland gained the possession of India, England would not have achieved the supreme position that she now holds in the Orient. Had not England acquired India, not only would it have been impossible for her to exploit the Malayan Peninsula but Canada and Australia would have long ago followed the American example and declared independence. Thus it is India and India only that has given England trade prosperity and the resources with which to meet the huge expenses for the maintenance of British naval power and for the protection of Australia and Canada. This explains why Britain has not suffered the same fate as Spain and Portugal, and has, instead, maintained her supremacy for a century.

There are enterprises which can be accomplished with great facility but abandoned without being brought to a successful conclusion. There are also cases in which an enterprise is started by accident and unexpectedly brings favorable results. The British conquest of India was undertaken entirely by the British East India Company without the intervention of the

British Government, and even Clive himself might not have realized at the time that the enterprise he had taken in hand was so closely bound up with the future destinies of England. The credit attributed to him in later generations has therefore been, earned only by accident.

We may thank Heaven that at the time of the British conquest of India no such Company had a stronghold in China, for otherwise China would have been conquered too. A British conquest of China in those days would have been as easy as the conquest of India. Around the year 1860, China was in the throes of civil strife, and her destiny was absolutely uncertain. The Manchu Emperor had died during his flight to the North, and the entire nation was not in a mood to resist foreign invasion. If Gordon had followed the methods of Clive and used a Chinese army to conquer China, he would probably have encountered no difficulty. How much easier the task would have been with the active support from the mother country! At that juncture, Portugal and Holland had fallen from power while France and Germany had not yet gained ascendancy. There was no match for England in a contest for colonies in the East. Since the Crimean War, in which Russia was defeated by Turkey with the joint assistance of England and France, England has capitalized on the mutual enmity between France and Prussia and endeavored to extend her influence in the Orient. Although the fall of Peking was affected by the joint forces of Britain and France, the latter had no base of operations in the East. If England, instead of being content with her trade position, had attempted to conquer China, no country would have been able to intervene effectively. If England could have managed within a space of ten years to grab the whole of China, all Asia would have fallen under British control, for during that period France had just been defeated by Prussia and the German Empire was still in its infancy. Had this been the case, Great Britain would not only have retained its firm grasp on India, but would also have been able to combine the territories of China and India into one, and secured an impregnable position in the world due to its monopolistic control of the largest market of the world. And not only would the present war not have happened, but nobody would ever have dared to cherish any designs on Britain, except in the event of a civil war on the British Isles. If we had been English, we would regret that there had been no genius in England in those days and that a golden opportunity should have been allowed to escape. But, being Chinese, we feel that we were very lucky that there was no such a genius in

England, which gives us a chance today to study the vital problems of China.

Looking back at the accidental acquisition of India and the accidental overlooking of China by England, we must say that unfortunately for England the conquest of India was not followed up with a conquest of China and that fortunately for China she has not been conquered. My assertions are supported by historical facts. The success of her imperialistic policies has helped Britain to retain all that she has acquired by accident from being also lost by accident. It was by sheer luck that China has escaped from being conquered by England, but unfortunately China takes no notice of this fact and is foolishly courting disaster.

Although Britain has missed the opportunity to conquer China, she has never abandoned her imperialistic designs. When at the end of her war France began to devote her efforts to the business of colonization in competition with England and Germany rose to power and joined in the contest, England then conceived the idea of partitioning China, in order to secure the control of the most important part of the Chinese territory to serve as a protective wall for the eastern frontier of India, thus redeeming the mistake that she has made in the past. But, before this project could be put into execution, Japan suddenly grew into a strong Power in the East and in a battle defeated China. Subsequently, the signs of China's disintegration have become more and more pronounced, but the sudden rise of Japan and the far-sighted policy of Russia have given a serious set back to the plot of dismembering China. Russia's victory over Turkey rendered it possible for her to obtain an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, but her efforts in this direction were frustrated by England, so Russia had to change her plans and make attempts on Sinkiang and India to the east of Turkey. To protect her imperial interests, England could not allow Russia to expand to such an extent that her own power on the Asiatic Continent would no longer be an effective restraint on Russia.

The rise of Japan afforded Britain an opportunity to use her as a weapon against Russia. The Anglo-Russian, rivalry in the East made it more difficult to arrive at some arrangement for an equitable division of spoils and consequently the idea of dismemberment gave way to the principle of the balance of power. In consequence of the Russo-Japanese

war, Japan's position grew stronger still, and Britain was unable to find any way to satisfy Japan in the event that the partitioning of China would be carried out. Japan, on her part, realizes that after the partition of China her own position would be imperiled, and accordingly she insists on preserving China's integrity. Just as the entry of France and Germany into the Asiatic area proved a hindrance to the British policy of conquest, changing it into a policy of dismemberment, so the ascendancy of Japan effectively put an end to the European attempts to divide up China, resulting in another change of British policy into one of maintaining the balance of power. Under such circumstances Britain has had to be content with only keeping her dominion over India intact. But, if Britain is content with India, must other countries be content with leaving Britain secure in the possession of India? Everybody knows that the answer is in the negative.

As the British Empire depends on India for its main support, it will do everything in its power to preserve India and will sacrifice everything else if necessary.

## Chapter VI

### BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE LAST CENTURY

The secret of the British success in maintaining such a vast empire is to be found primarily in the traditional foreign policy of Britain. Since England's defeat of Spain's Invincible Armada, she has been pursuing a fixed foreign policy, that is, the policy of rallying the weaker countries to crush the strongest.

In the latter half of the 18th century, England's policy was directed against France, simply because France in the reigns of Louis XIV and Louis XV, was the strongest country in Europe; not because England wanted to redress any possible wrongs suffered by her in the Hundred-Year's War, nor because England had any territorial ambitions in Europe. In order to maintain her own interests England cannot allow any country on the European Continent to grow too strong, and when any country grows too strong, she must get all the other countries to join her in overthrowing that country.

In the century following the war with France, which ended in the Battle of Waterloo, British power has never waned until today. It must not be imagined, however, that in all these years she has not been busy in maintaining the Empire. France since her defeat has not been much of a menace to England. But the steady growth of Russia has been a threat to Turkey, and if Turkey should fall into her hands, she would seize Egypt and use it as a base for the control of the Red Sea. Then England will lose her command over the Mediterranean, and the door of India will become insecure.

Accordingly, in the middle of the 19th century England turned her attention from France to Russia and supported Turkey in her resistance against Russia under the oft-repeated pretext of "aiding the weak in resisting the aggressor." Then, as now, the Turks worshipped Mohammedanism, and were perhaps even more harsh on the Christians than they are at present. Yet, the Christian British did not hesitate to send an expeditionary force to aid the "heathen" Turks. Nowadays, it is often said by the British that Turkish civilization has become unfit for Europe and must be driven back to Asia where it belongs. The British are as

cunning as the fox and as changeable as the weather, and they are not ashamed of themselves. The truth is that formerly Britain was trying to save Turkey in order to save India, she is obliged to join Russia in attacking Turkey. It is to be recalled that Britain defeated Russia in a war in 1853; and in 1877, when Turkey suffered defeat and was negotiating peace with Russia, Britain induced Germany to join her in exerting pressure on Russia. Since the defeat of Napoleon, Britain has consistently followed a pro-French and anti-Russian policy, simply because France has been on the decline and Russia in the ascendant.

While France was planning to avenge the defeat she had suffered at the hands of Prussia, Bismarck was trying to involve England and France in an internecine struggle. He incited France to join in the scramble for colonial possessions. Accordingly, France occupied Tunis, Algeria, Annam and Madagascar, and extended her influence to Morocco. Such action offended both England and Italy. Bismarck then brought Italy into the Triple Alliance and set England to fight Russia and France. England at that time was hostile to Russia and France, but friendly to Germany, and the worsening of her relations with Russia and France culminated in a clash in the Orient.

The British, believing that their power in the East was not strong enough to combat Russia, took advantage of Japan's anti-Russian feelings, as a result of Russia's intervention in the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula, to instigate Japan to resist Russia. Japan's object in her war with Russia was, according to the Japanese themselves, to obtain Korea and keep the Three Eastern Provinces from being occupied by Russian troops. In the eyes of the British, however, the Japanese were only guarding India for Britain and driving out a British enemy from the East. When Russia was at the height of her power, Britain tried daily to prevail upon Japan to attack her; when Russia was on the decline and Japan in the ascendant, Britain began to employ all kinds of tricks to put Japan in an embarrassing position. Such has been the consistent British policy during the last hundred years. Those who are surprised at the ingratitude of Britain have not studied the history of England.

While Britain was using Japan to check the expansion of Russia, Germany's power was growing stronger and stronger, so that Britain had to turn her attention from France and Russia and combine with various

countries in an effort to beat Germany. Hence, the present war. Bismarck in defining Germany's policy said that Germany should allow France to pursue colonial expansion abroad so that Germany might devote her efforts to internal reforms, and it was only after Germany had set her own house in order that she might further her interests abroad.

Presently, France in extending her colonial possessions came into serious conflict with Britain, as expected by Germany. At that time England was endeavoring to obtain the exclusive control over Egypt, and France stood in her way. On the other hand, France was trying to strengthen her hand in Morocco, and Britain, fearing that such action might jeopardize Gibraltar, would not permit the French seizure of this northern African port. A showdown was imminent.

It happened at this moment, however, that Wilhelm II had dismissed Bismarck and was trying to extend German influence abroad. German activities at various points along the eastern and western coasts of Africa brought Germany into conflict with Britain who was finally compelled to reach an understanding with France, whereby France pledged herself to respect the British interests in Egypt and Britain pledged herself to respect the dominant position of France in Morocco. At that time, Russia had not yet been defeated in the East. After Russia's defeat, England and France drew closer together. France proceeded to enforce the understanding with Britain by armed intervention in Morocco, and the French action elicited a protest from Germany. The French Foreign Minister Delcassé then obtained an assurance from Britain that, in the event of an open conflict between France and Germany, Britain would dispatch 200,000 troops to aid France by an attack on the Kiel Canal through Denmark. (Such a move would have been the same as the forcible entry of German troops into Belgium. Britain has not carried it out simply because she has so far had no occasion to do so, not because she has any regard for humanitarianism and justice.) Finally, however, the controversy between Germany and France was settled through mediation. But, thanks to King Edward VII of England and the French Foreign Minister Delcassé the Anglo-French Entente has remained a reality up to the present day.

In the last hundred years England has thus twice changed her attitude towards France from enmity to friendship, and once towards Russia and Germany from friendship to enmity. The key policy of England is to

attack the strongest country with the help of weaker countries, and join the weakened enemy in checking the growth of a third country. The British foreign policy has remained basically unchanged for two centuries. When England befriends another country, the purpose is not to maintain a cordial friendship for the sake of friendship but to utilize that country as a tool to fight a third country. When an enemy has been shorn of his power, he is turned into a friend, and the friend who has become strong, into an enemy. England always remains in a commanding position; she makes other countries fight her wars and she herself reaps the fruits of victory. She has been doing so for hundreds of years.

Speaking of the British diplomacy, therefore, England will never take any country for a permanent friend or enemy, and except for India and a few other territories essential to the security of India, she is prepared, if needs be, to part with all her colonial possessions, not excluding the areas where British influence has always prevailed. Morocco, for instance, was for a long time under British influence, but when England wanted French assistance in a fight against Germany, she showed no reluctance in surrendering it to France. This demonstrates the fact that England is ready to make every sacrifice to break the power of any formidable rival in Europe in order to preserve the British Empire, or in other words, to preserve India.

From the moral point of view, to harm others at the expense of oneself is a sin, but for the promotion of one's own interest nothing is better than the British policy. In the case of the British alliance with Japan, France and Russia, the truth is that these countries are not as strong as Germany and it suits Britain's convenience to join them together and put them under her leadership.

In Turkey Britain contemplated using the same policy — to cut off Germany from the Orient, and at the same time restrain the Russian ambitions. But, as the English often say, blood is thicker than water, and the British are constantly helping the White men under Turkish control to dissociate themselves from Turkey and pledge loyalty to Britain. The declaration of independence by Greece is already an evidence of the British efforts in this direction. Since then, Britain has been clandestinely aiding Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Bulgaria in checking the expansion of Russia.

As a result, Turkey has steadfastly refused to play into the hands of Britain and has, instead, formed an alliance with Germany. If the reverse had been the case, Britain might have offered Turkey as an inducement to Russia and Constantinople might have long ago fallen under Russian domination. When, before Turkey's rupture of relations with Britain and Russia, Britain was trying to induce Turkey to assist her, the entire British nation was of the opinion that it was solely due to British patronage that Turkey was able to remain what she was; no account was taken of the Turkish resentment against Russia, and the belief was entertained that, once Turkey threw herself into the arms of Britain, advantage could be taken of her to satisfy the aspirations of Russia. When another country is strong enough to be utilized, Britain sacrifices her own allies to satisfy its desires, but when that country becomes too weak to be of any use to herself, she sacrifices it to please other countries. This is plainly written in history. The opinion is expressed in some quarters that if Turkey had maintained neutrality, she would have been safe from Russian and British attacks. But these people do not know that Britain is willing to give every benefit to her allies only when her allies are powerful enough to help her to fight her enemies, and that, when the allies are too weak, she subjects them to torture for the purpose of pleasing these enemies.

In other words, Britain seeks friendship only with those which can render her services, and when her friends are too weak to be of any use to her, they must be sacrificed in her interests. Britain's tender regard for her friends is like the delicate care usually shown by farmers in the rear-ing of silkworms; after all the silk has been drawn from the cocoons, they are destroyed by fire or used as food for fish. The present friends of Britain are no more than silkworms, and they are receiving the tender care of Britain simply because there is still some silk left in them. When Serbia attacked Austria under orders from Russia, she was acting under the indirect instructions of Britain, Serbia, in taking the initiative and bearing the brunt of the staking the fate of the nation, was praised as loyal to Britain. But how has, in return, Britain treated her? Before Bulgaria attached herself to Germany, did not the British offer her a slice of Serbian territory to induce her to join the war on the British side? The Anglo-Bulgarian negotiations failed, but this afforded Britain an excuse for her diplomatic fiasco in the Balkans. If Britain wanted to satisfy the Bulgarian desires, why did she not sacrifice her own interest? Why did she not sacrifice Russia's interests? Why must she sacrifice Serbia's interests?

The reason is that the strength of Serbia was already waning, while Bulgaria was still strong enough to be of service. Is not Albania the object of Serbia's day-dreams? Both ethnologically and geographically Albania is closely related to Serbia. Owing to the lack of an outlet to the sea, Serbia was compelled to exert all her strength in a struggle with Turkey for the possession of Albanian territory, but in the end Austria stepped in and thwarted Serbia's ambitions. In view of Serbia's defeat at the hands of Austria, Britain and France should have offered Albania to Serbia in return for Serbian assistance. But, in order to win Italian support, England and France did not hesitate to recognize Albania as within the Italian sphere of influence. From the way in which Britain treats Serbia, we know that if Turkey had joined England and Russia in fighting Germany and Austria, England would not have helped Turkey to frustrate Russian ambitions. As Turkey's strength would have been exhausted before Russia's, Turkish interests would have had to be sacrificed to Russia.

In the present war, has Britain any Allies who have not received any inducement? In the case of Italy and Rumania, the conditions of entry into the war are territorial promises. In the case of Japan, the inducement is Shantung and the South Sea Islands. Innumerable promises have been made to many other countries such as Bulgaria and Greece, though they have not been accepted. Britain made all these promises at the expense of other countries; there is not a single case in which she offered anything of her own. In every instance the promise to an ally is either to take something from the enemy or to persuade a friend to give up something against his will. Thus, without any sacrifice of her own interests, England has induced many Powers to place themselves at her service. She has a wonderful genius for sacrificing the interests of other countries. She is so merciless that she will sacrifice any country!

Serbia has fallen into the British trap and perished. Turkey has, fortunately, refused the British overtures. If she had accepted the British overtures, she would have been persuaded to give up Armenia and Constantinople to Russia in order to induce Russia to send an army against Germany; a slice of territory in East Turkey would have been given to Bulgaria in order to win the Bulgarian support for Britain; and a portion of land in the southwest of Turkey would have been handed over to Greece. All the Balkan States were wavering in their attitude, because they had territorial ambitions. If Turkey had declared herself to be a friend of

Britain, all the Balkan States would also have pledged their support to Britain. Not that Turkey is influential enough to command such a big following, but the fertile soil and the rich resources of Turkey are a sufficient attraction to the various Balkan States, whose people, in case of Anglo-Turkish friendship, would flock to that country in large number, thereby considerably reducing the extent of Turkish territory. In such an event England would have gained an advantage over Turkey.

Therefore, unless a country is strong enough, it must not befriend England, otherwise it will not escape the fate of being sacrificed. If a country is not strong enough and does not want to be sacrificed by England, the best way for it to take is to remain neutral. If, however, a choice must be made between friendship and enmity for England, one would rather decide in favor of the later. Notwithstanding any doubt that one may entertain concerning the fortunes of the war, an excellent lesson has been furnished by Serbia and Turkey. Mine-owners, in the South Sea Islands induce laborers to work their mines by offering the best treatment, but the moment the laborers come to work, they are treated like beasts and that there is no chance for escape. Such is the way in which the British treat their friends. Should a country follow the example of Serbia or that of Turkey?

It may be argued, "It is natural that Britain does not want to sacrifice her own interests. When she finds it necessary to sacrifice the interests of other countries, why does she sacrifice the interests of her allies and leave the interests of neutrals untouched?" The reply to such an argument is this: not that England does not want to sacrifice the interests of neutrals, but because she cannot do so. The friends of Britain are friends in name only. They are absolutely under the control of Britain. As long as Britain finds them useful, she protects their interests, but as soon as their usefulness is finished, she offers them for sale to the highest bidder. Since her friends have the right to be protected, have they not the obligation to allow their interests to be disposed of as well? Take the exchange of Morocco for Egypt, for example. If Britain had no influence in Morocco, France would not have consented to give up Egypt in exchange, and, on the other hand, if France had no influence over Egypt, England would not have agreed to give up Morocco in exchange. There is a story in the Analects of a man named Wei Sheng-kaio who asked his neighbor for some vinegar and gave it to a beggar. As soon as the vinegar passed into Wei's hands, it

became his property. As far as the beggar was concerned no enquiry need be made into the original ownership of the vinegar. He was grateful to Wei, of course. But, supposing Wei had told the beggar to approach the neighbor himself, i.e. our neutral country; although Wei might have perhaps given the beggar something in addition to the vine-gar, the beggar would have been grateful to the neighbor, not to Wei. This story illustrates the fact that the interests of neutral countries cannot be used as bait. Britain is trying so hard to befriend everybody, not because all friends are strong enough to give her support but because their interests can be sacrificed by Britain. We can now see the real value of neutrality.

The policy which England has pursued for two centuries has brought her prosperity and greatness. After each victory over a strong Power in Europe, England seems, on the surface, to have gained for herself no advantage whatever; all she did, she claimed to be an act of international chivalry and justice. An analysis of the acts of British statesmen reveals that they never speak the truth. As British dominions extend all over the globe, any country that gains ascendancy in Europe inevitably comes into conflict with the colonial interests of Britain, and in order preserve her colonial interests, Britain must fight that country to check its expansion. If the designs of other countries are in distant places, as in the case of France and Italy whose ambitions are fixed on the northern coasts of Africa, a compromise with England can be easily reached. But any really strong country in Europe cannot be satisfied with a few possessions on the African coasts and must make India the object of its ambitions. As the British Empire could not be an empire without the possession of India, England must rally other countries to her side in a struggle against such a strong Power. England is always prompt enough to nip such a Power in the bud, so that the world never sees her real intentions and thinks that she is only chivalrous in thwarting the strong. Everything that England does is for the purpose of ensuring the security of India.

However, since the outbreak of this unprecedented war, the position of Great Britain has changed considerably. With the return of peace, should England maintain her traditional policy or modify it to meet changed circumstances? This is the question which requires our consideration. If we were called upon to work, with our heart and soul, to evolve a plan on behalf of Britain for the preservation of India and the British Empire, we would suggest to Britain that her traditional policy

should be partly modified and partly left as it is. The principle of antagonizing the strongest country should be discarded, but the principle of sacrificing friendly countries which are comparatively weak, must be adhered to.

Prior to the outbreak of the war England was always able, after every victory over a strong enemy, to enjoy peace and security for a few decades, during which period she could, more or less leisurely, make preparations against the rise of some other country. The country which is crushed by England has suffered so much that she would be unable to recover for several decades, while that country against which she is constantly on the watch would be crushed before it could grow into full strength. The British policy therefore needs no change in this respect. Since the ascendancy of Germany, however, England has found the situation out of control. Just as England was trying to check the growth of France, Germany came into power and had to be overthrown, so England had to come to the aid of France before the latter becomes too weak. England was about to restrain the growth of Russia, but before the latter was completely vanquished, she feared that Japan might grow too strong and uncontrollable. Thus in her desperate situation she managed skillfully to win the support of Russia and France for a war against Germany, and at the same time coerced Japan into joining her party.

The present alliance against Germany is the result of ten years of strenuous efforts on the part of England. Frankly speaking, if we leave out of consideration the interests of Britain's allies, British policy cannot be but admitted as a great success. It must be pointed out, however, that the success cannot be fully satisfactory to England, for granted that Germany will be defeated, she may rise again from her undying ashes, and, what is worse, even though France may not become more powerful, it is quite probable that Russia will grow too strong. Since the cessation of the Russo-Japanese hostilities, Russia and Japan, both, have accordingly drawn themselves closer together, and separated themselves from England. After the defeat of Germany, Russia may grow too powerful. England may then desire to fight Russia, but there will be no country to ally with her.

Furthermore, when England some years ago persuaded Japan into fighting Russia, her own power has remained absolutely unimpaired. Supposing that by a stroke of luck England emerges victorious from the

present war, her national wealth and manpower will be exhausted at the conclusion of the war. She will neither be able to fight with Russia herself nor to set some other country to fight for her, since the lessons of Turkey and Serbia have been deeply inculcated into the minds of all European statesmen. It will be impossible for England to find another loyal servant like Serbia. In the past, at the end of every war from which England and her allies emerged victorious, she, as the leader of the alliance, invariably obtained the lion's share of the spoils; so both her enemies and her friends were afraid of her. In the present war, however, Britain's allies all are aware of the fact that England is not so formidable as she seems; they have no longer any respect for her.

It is obvious, therefore, that after the war England will no longer be able to control the European situation. On the contrary, should England fail to win the present war, Russia, knowing that Britain's friendship for her is insincere, will be unfaithful to her, and Japan, which must have by now repented her past mistake of playing into the hands of England, will withdraw her support from her. In such event, Germany will still remain the strongest country in the world. (A German victory may be prophesied from the present tendencies of the war. Even if peace should be concluded on the basis of the American President's proposal envisaging a drawn battle, Germany will nevertheless remain in a supreme position.) If England cannot now realize her desire of beating Germany, how can she do so in the future? This is again as plain as the day and leaves no room for argument.

For the sake of safeguarding her future interests, therefore, England must not take the strongest country as an enemy and must, instead, take the strongest country as a friend and conspire with it to divide the interests of the world between themselves. The interests outside her homeland may one after the other be sacrificed, and in choosing whom to sacrifice she must start out with the most intimate one. This is the proper policy Britain should adopt in compensating her friends' efforts to keep India under her domination.



## Chapter VII

### BRITAIN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN CASE OF ALLIED VICTORY

Those who are in favor of taking the side of the Allies claim that the Allies will win, whereas those opposed to it contend that they will lose. From the standpoint of morality it is absolutely unjustifiable for a country to rally to the support of another country simply because it will win, or to desert it simply because it will lose. But in the opinion of the advocates of war the interests of one's own country must be paramount. The contention that if it be to the benefit of one's own country no regard should be given to moral principles may be allowed to stand. Let us now leave aside the question as to whether the Allies will win or lose, but imagine what Britain's position will be after the Allies have scored a decisive victory. Attention is drawn to the fact that what Britain now counts upon to defeat Germany is not her own armed strength, for, despite her naval force, which is almost double that of Germany, her blockade of Germany's coasts has so far proved ineffective, unable to prevent German submarines from playing terrible havoc among the Allies. Britain has an army of five million men, yet her military achievements are insignificant.

With her prestige lost both on land and at sea, England remains the leader of the Allies only on account of her ability to furnish them with financial assistance. After this war, Britain will have no such weapon with which to deal a fatal blow in other nations. A new nation will thus arise and assume the leadership of the European nations. France is already in a declining stage. After the war, she will be so exhausted that it will be impossible for her to grow strong all of a sudden. As to Italy, although she is a new nation with a modern Government, her naval and land forces are too weak to claim much attention. Judging from her failure in the present war to make much headway against Austria, whatever the reasons, it may be expected that after the war she will meet with many difficulties. Italy is not on particularly intimate terms with Britain and France, and against Germany and Austria she bears a deep grudge. It is evident, therefore, that Italy will, as yet, not prove a formidable rival to Britain. In East Asia, Britain may continue to follow the policy of playing Japan off against Russia, which she has pursued for over a decade, and in addition play off the United States against Japan.

The only country which Britain cannot outdo is Russia. Since the reformation of Russia by Peter the Great during the early part of the 18th century, Russia has always cherished the ambition of conquering the world. The so-called "Peter's Will" is known to all. Furthermore, Russia's geographical position may prove an asset in the pursuit of her object, for this least invaded country in Europe is bordered on the north by a vast desert of ice and snow, and on the east and south by barbarian countries not only incapable of harassing her, but also well-adapted to satisfy her territorial aspirations.

In every battle Russia has fought, her enemy invariably approached either from the west or from the southwest. When she triumphed over an enemy, she always seized his territory to extend her own influence; when she was defeated, she retreated into a region fortified with natural barriers so that her enemy could not beat her to her knees. Looking back on Russia's past, we find that Peter the Great was once defeated by the Swedish King, Carol XII, but the country of Russia was never conquered. Eight years after his defeat, Russia took revenge and seized the Swedish coast in the Baltic. Later, Russia took part in the Seven Years War. She also took advantage of Poland's feebleness to obtain a share of her land. In spite of the many reverses suffered by Russia at the hands of France during the Napoleonic wars, even Napoleon himself could find no way of conquering Russia. In 1812, the French launched an expeditionary campaign against Russia, and, after winning many battles, finally gained an overwhelming victory at Borodino. The French occupied Moscow, but finally they were obliged to retreat under such conditions that their troops were literally annihilated at Leipzig.

That Russia after having been defeated could still gain a final victory over the French was due to no other factor than her favorable geographical situation. Again, in the middle of the 19th century, Russia successfully carried out her territorial designs on Turkey. Due to the resistance of the combined British and French forces, the Czar was killed and the Russian troops defeated, culminating in the loss of territory and the dismantling of her fortifications, with her fleet deprived of the freedom to sail about in the Black Sea. Yet, her power was by no means broken, as may be inferred from the fact that shortly after she sent out another expedition eastward to the Persian Gulf. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Russia has been making attempts to exploit Central Asia. In 1873,

she occupied the vital port of Krasnodsk on the Caspian Sea, invaded the Urt Ust Plateau, and then waited for an opportunity to annex Afghanistan. Owing to a clash of interests, Persia became a bone of contention between Britain and Russia, and it was not until 1907 that these two countries reached an agreement under which the northern part of Persia was recognized as a Russian sphere of influence, and the southern part as a British sphere of influence, leaving the central part as a buffer zone. In consequence of this arrangement, Russia had been prevented from realizing her ambitions in the Persian Gulf, notwithstanding her endeavors during the past thirty years. In the East, Russia has met with such strong resistance from Japan that she has lost even what she has already acquired.

Any other country would have perished under similar circumstances, but Russia remained intact. In her moments of triumph, she made her power felt in Sweden, divided Poland, and invaded Central Asia; when luck was against her, she had only to retreat from Moscow, allow Sebastopol to be captured, revise the Berlin Treaty, withdraw from Port Arthur and South Manchuria, and make certain concessions regarding the Persian Gulf. Russia, occupying a naturally advantageous position, is impregnable. She is waiting for an opportunity to conquer others.

Britain is certainly no match for her. British diplomacy is distinguished by ingenuity and versatility. It is the most effective and efficacious in the world thanks to the far-sightedness and firm character of those entrusted with the conduct of affairs. In the present war, Britain is only indirectly involved; the countries directly involved are France and Russia. Germany can torment France and Russia, because she is superior to them in military strength. Should France and Russia capitulate, it is unlikely that Germany will make an immediate onslaught on British soil. But Britain realizes that if Germany should attain her objects in France and Russia, she will be the strongest Power in the world, and that it would then be too late to fight against her. Knowing that Germany will sooner or later inflict harm on her, Britain joined with France and Russia in an attack against Germany. It is true that France and Russia has grudges against Germany, and have become Allies for this reason. It was not however until the dispute arose over Morocco and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that they came into irreconcilable conflict with Germany, and finally resorted to force to settle the issues. In both cases England was in the background urging France and Russia to resist Germany. From this it

appears that the British foreign policy is far too shrewd for any ordinary person to see through.

In the present war Britain has every reason to remain neutral, but she has not done so. On the contrary, just at the moment when negotiations were under way for a settlement of the questions at issue, she suddenly informed the French Ambassador in London that she had warned Germany to be ready for hostilities. This adamant attitude on the part of Britain must have been the result of calculation and deliberation. Moreover, when Germany proposed to preserve France and her colonies in return for British neutrality and enquired whether Britain would remain neutral if Belgium's neutrality was respected, Britain replied that her freedom of action should not be interfered with, and she could not pledge herself to take a neutral stand. (In the light of this, Britain's statement that she is fighting for Belgium's neutrality is surely a misstatement of fact).

The above shows that the reason why Britain has endeavored to prevent France and Russia from fighting alone with Germany, and has entered the war herself, is that she was terribly scared of Germany. Although Britain has no grievance against Germany, she is afraid that Germany may grow too strong. She may succeed in removing the menace, but then there will still remain the potential danger of Russia. Hitherto, Germany has been a direct menace to France and Russia and only an indirect menace to Britain; consequently, Russia and France have played into the hands of Britain. In the future, however, if Russia should achieve supremacy, Britain will be directly hit. That is why Britain is so frightened of Russia.

In the meantime, Russia is fighting Germany on behalf of England and is making good progress. If at this moment Britain should unite with another country to attack Russia, then all the other countries will take a lesson from Russia and desist from aiding Britain. This is a possibility which British statesmen cannot afford to overlook. If Germany is vanquished, she will have to renounce all ideas of an eastern adventure and thus will avoid friction with Russia. France and Italy have always maintained close relations with Russia. There is no desire on the part of the United States to meddle with the affairs of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Japan has already adopted a friendly attitude towards Russia. Under such circumstances it will be impossible for Britain to find any ally against

Russia. In view of this, Britain will be obliged to change her tactics and unite with Russia at the proper opportunity. As no amount of eloquence can convert Russia into an ally, Britain will have to offer some benefit to prevent her from invading India. Moreover, the benefit must be something which Britain can afford to give; it must not be merely a verbal promise.

What if Britain offers her possessions in Africa as art inducement to Russia? The answer is that the acquisition of some plots of land on the African continent is of no use to Russia's national economy. Should Britain give up, say, Egypt as an additional offer to Russia, she will lose her connection with India and be compelled to revert to the ancient route via the Cape of Good Hope. As this would be tantamount to suicide, Britain will not allow Egypt to be taken from her. At any rate, it is certain that Russia will not be content with a few coastal acquisitions in Africa. Supposing, again, that Britain should make some territorial concessions in Asia and surrender, say, Persia and Afghanistan to Russia, the frontiers of India would be exposed to danger. In any case, such concessions would not satisfy Russia's wild ambitions. Therefore, Britain must sacrifice India to win Russia's alliance, unless, of course, she can find a gift as good as India. As China is best qualified to become a second India and is the most acceptable alternative to Russia, it is inevitable that she will be sacrificed in lieu of India as soon as an Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* is reached.

A country must find colonies when its population is daily increasing and its national wealth is exhausted. The acquisition of colonies helps to avert the danger of overproduction. If a colony is situated in an arid and cold region that requires reclamation, considerable funds must be expended before it can become prosperous. There is also the likelihood that, when such a colony has grown prosperous, the colonial population will think itself full-fledged enough to desert its mother country. Britain has already lost the United States as a colony, and may yet lose Australia and Canada. This is due to no other reason than the productive power of a new colony is furnished by the settlers. In colonies where there are few natives, the native population has little capacity for production and consumption. After a colony has been fully developed, its production map is barely sufficient for its own consumption, so it cannot benefit its mother country. Every citizen loves his fatherland. Bound to the land of birth by ties of consanguinity and friendship, no man will emigrate unless the advantages offered by another country are many times those which he enjoys in his

land. Every country which sets out to acquire colonies, hopes to find colonies which can supply her with raw materials and markets for her industrial output, so that her people may not have to go abroad to earn a comfortable living.

Hence, a desirable colony must be one with a large, industrious population, which can provide the mother country with an abundance of raw materials and which has an increasing power of consumption. Any colony which has been developed entirely by emigrants from the mother country, has at first no such power of consumption, but finally grows into a self-sufficient organization which cannot be held under control. As to colonies inhabited by people of a different race, however, the ruling country can treat the natives unjustly and keep them perpetually in a state of serfdom, so that a profitable trade can be carried on forever by the ruling country and the colony thus always be a market for her industrial products. In the present day world, these are the best qualifications for a new colony, and the only countries which possess all the qualifications are China and India.

Both China and India may be useful to Russia in her efforts to attain prosperity, and so, for her own interests, Russia probably would gladly take China as an alternative to India. Using the transport facilities afforded by the double-tracked Siberian Railway, Russia has long ago completed arrangements for encircling North Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. Should Britain help Russia to check the power of Japan, Russia can march southwards without any hindrance. There is no doubt that if Britain desires an alliance with Russia after the termination of hostilities, Russia will readily agree to such an alliance. In such an event, Britain will be able to annex Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan and other countries, as well as Tibet, and take the Caucasian and Kunlun Mountains and the Caspian Sea in the north as her natural boundaries.

When things come to such a pass, the position of France, Italy, and the Balkan States will be worse than that of Britain and Russia, and the coastal areas on both sides of the Mediterranean will fall under British domination. Britain will then have the whole of Europe under her thumb just as she has Spain and Portugal under her thumb today. As Britain will be mistress of the sea, while Russia will be supreme on land, there will be no conflict of interests, and peace may reign over the earth, possible for a

century. It is not difficult to foresee Britain's attitude in case of her victory in the present war. And if at the conclusion of the war the British statesmen should miss the rare opportunity to further British interests along the lines suggested above, we shall doubt their loyalty to their own country.

## Chapter VIII

### CONSEQUENCES OF ALLIED DEFEAT OR STALEMATE

Let us imagine what the conditions in the world will be if the Allies should be defeated. Being the leader of the Allies, Britain has the authority to propose an armistice, and can always, at a favorable moment, choose to make peace. It is also up to Britain to decide when to negotiate peace should neither side wins a decisive victory.

Britain and her Allies anticipated at first that if they attacked Germany and Austria with their combined total strength, which they believed was many times greater than, that of Germany and Austria, the war would be brought to an end in less than a month. But things have, turned out contrary to their expectations and the war has dragged on indefinitely. Russia has repeatedly suggested an armistice, and a Peace Movement has been set on foot by the Caillaux group in France. Having perceived this trend of affairs, Britain hastened to take steps to prevent peace from being made by any of her Allies. As a result, a Pact has been signed according to which the Allies undertook not to negotiate peace separately [Declaration between the British, French and Russian Governments of September 5, 1914.]; to this Pact Japan and Italy have also become signatories. The Allies are thus prevented from negotiating peace without Britain's consent, while, on the other hand, whenever Britain wants to make peace, the other Allied countries will undoubtedly give their consent. This is because Britain holds the purse strings of France and Russia, and has also the power to deal them a fatal blow by suddenly discontinuing her supply of coal to France and of munitions to Russia. Under such circumstances, France and Russia must always agree with Britain, having by the said Pact virtually delegated to her the full authority of making peace.

Thus empowered, Britain is in a position to bring Germany to accept such peace terms as may provide a suitable basis for a future Anglo-German rapprochement, whatever the final outcome of the war may be. Although Britain and Germany are at war, Britain can always get into close contact with Germany. Whether Britain will actually get into close touch with Germany or not, however, depends on the following two conditions:

- (1) Whether or not Britain will find it necessary to enter into an alliance with Germany. (This is one of the questions to be discussed in this Chapter.)
- (2) How far the other Allied powers will adhere to the terms of the said pact. Up to the present, many rumors have already been circulated to the effect that Russia would make a separate peace with Germany, and Italy has officially announced that if German and Austrian troops are increased, it will be unable to hold out against them without British and French reinforcements. It is open to question whether Russia and Italy are willing to suffer the same fate as Serbia, Belgium, Montenegro and Rumania. If Russia and Italy make a separate peace, Britain will be likely to suffer.

Since Britain has the full control of the situation, she certainly will think out some way to exercise that power in the event of the Allies not winning the war, including the eventuality of the war resulting in a draw. Britain's position is such as has been explained already in Chapter VI. If she cannot pursue the traditional policy of antagonizing the most powerful nation, as she has done during the past hundred years, she will have to befriend that most powerful nation. If the Allies cannot win the war, they will have no hope of ever destroying the German militarism, and after the war Germany will still remain the strongest country. It is not unreasonable therefore to presume that Britain will adopt a friendly attitude towards Germany.

Germany's position is quite different from Russia's. The two countries have established their Governments on different principles and have gone through different experiences. Russia is immune from attacks on all sides except from the southwest. She is also protected by lakes and rivers and by the rigors of her climate. Germany, on the contrary, is surrounded on all sides by hostile countries. While Russia's fundamental policy is seclusion and conservatism, Germany can follow no other policy than one of rapid progress. Modern history shows that Russia has remained intact in spite of repeated military reverses.

Since its establishment as a State, Prussia has gone through alternating experiences of glorious triumph and ignominious defeat; she cannot afford to remain stagnant. Her military system has been reformed on three occasions, and each reform brought wonderful results. Under the direction of Frederick the Great Germany became a military State and rose to the rank of a great Power. In the Napoleonic wars, however, she was defeated and fell into a helpless condition. Seeing her country humiliated by France, Queen Louisa planned for revenge. Due to restrictions imposed on her by France, Prussia had at that time very few troops, so Scharnhorst introduced the system of conscription to build up a large army. As a result, the Prussian army, towards the end of the last Napoleonic war, was more powerful than the army of any other country on the European Continent. In the reign of Wilhelm I the Prussian military system was further improved and the army increased, and after inflicting a defeat on Austria and France, Wilhelm I founded the German Empire. Owing to her geographical position, which gives her no chance for natural development, Prussia must go out and fight for expansion. Defeat only temporarily arrests her growth. Such being the case, unless the Allies win the present war, the German influence will spread all over the world. As soon as any country begins to extend its influence, it inevitably comes into conflict with Britain a natural result of the British possession of colonies almost everywhere in the world, as has been described already in a preceding Chapter.

How is Britain going to protect herself against the expansion of German power and influence? Just as in case of victory she will befriend Russia, so, when she realizes the futility of an armed contest with Germany, she will probably divide the spoils of war with Germany. If she does not do so, German influence will spread to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, thus threatening Egypt and Persia. To deprive Britain of Egypt is to cut her throat, and to rob her of India is to take the ladder away from under her feet. She will never allow this to be done to her. It must not be imagined for a moment that Britain does not desire to retain forever her supremacy in Europe. The fact is that even if she wins the present war, she will never be able to retain her supremacy, and that she will have no option but to reach a *rapprochement* with Germany. This is a case of "necessity gives birth to probability." Because Britain desires to attain the above object, she will constantly do her utmost to prevent peace negotiations as long as Germany refuses a *rapprochement* with her. If Germany knew all this and offered reasonable concessions to satisfy Britain, Britain would

certainly make peace on behalf of the Allies. At the time of the signing of the "No-Separate-Peace Pact," Britain knew that it is she and only she alone that can block the way to peace negotiations or help to bring them to a successful conclusion. It is quite conceivable that Germany would offer some special advantages to Britain as the condition for not breaking-up peace negotiations, even if the Allies should be defeated.

It is thus necessary and therefore probable that Britain will come to a *rapprochement* with Germany and will find some way to satisfy the latter country. Although Germany has colonies in Africa, she cannot carry out her policy of occupying the whole width of that continent. Germany will never be satisfied with minor colonial acquisitions on the African coast. Germany's exploitation of Persia is only a preliminary step to the conquest of India; she will never be satisfied with the occupation of Central Asia only. To gratify Germany's desire, Britain must offer China as an inducement, as she would have to do also in case of an alliance with Russia.

The success of an alliance does not depend on a treaty, but on common interests. As has been explained in a previous Chapter, Britain has no urgent necessity to engage in a war with Germany. Since Britain cannot attain her object of crushing the most powerful nation, she must, in order to preserve her own existence, forego the benefits she hopes to acquire for the sake of the benefits already acquired. With Britain's help, Germany will obtain the benefits which she desires. Thus the two countries will have common interests and will form a natural alliance. For example, Italy, which is a close neighbor of France and which has achieved independence with French assistance, entered the Triple Alliance against France when she wanted some territory on the northern coast of Africa and found her interests identical with those of Germany and Austria. After her war with Turkey, her interests began to conflict with Austria's, and she began to develop a friendly attitude towards France. The feeling of racial affinity revived, and gratitude was expressed for the past French assistance in helping Italy to establish herself as an independent State.

It is therefore plain that international friendships and enmities as well as promises and agreements are always changing according to circumstances and can therefore not be permanently relied upon. The so-called "racial ties" are only a circumstance which makes it easier for two

countries to realize their common interests, while feelings and emotions are factors which change from time to time. No permanent policy can be founded on the basis of such factors. To bring about a true community of interests between two countries, each must be resolved to make concessions to the other. In case of reconciliation between two countries, each must adopt a long-range view and make concessions necessary for the development of both. If Britain and Germany reach a *rapprochement* on this basis, Germany will abandon the ambition of invading India and exploiting Africa, and, instead, devote its efforts to the exploitation of the Far East. Hence Britain will remain the Empire that she is and Germany can succeed with her *Drang nach dem Osten*. We therefore reaffirm that an Anglo-German Alliance will be the natural result of the present conflict.

Historically, ever since the time of Frederick the Great, Britain has been an ally of Prussia, or at least observed strict neutrality in every war involving Prussia. Except for some short-lived conflicts during the last few years, there have never been any serious differences between England and Germany. Ethnologically, the Anglo-Saxons are a branch of the Teutonic race, and as a result of unceasing contact between the British and German peoples, British and German bloods have mixed together to a considerable extent. Hence, the British and Germans are more closely related to each other than the French and Belgians. There is not much racial difference between the British, the Americans, the Germans, and the Austrians. Once Britain and Germany lay down their arms and try to forget their differences, they will find it even easier to form a Teutonic alliance than in the case of Germany and Austria.

If anyone is startled at the suggestion of the possibility of an Anglo-German alliance, he has probably not read history. Any doubt concerning this possibility may be dispelled by considering the case of Japan and Russia. Only ten years ago these two countries threw the full weight of their strength into a war between themselves. Japan's declaration of war against Germany took place only a little over eight years after the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty. I happened to be in Tokyo at the time when Japan and Russia were engaged in peace negotiations and saw the intense excitement of the Japanese people who accused Komura, the Japanese delegate to the Peace Conference, of being a traitor, and the Premier Taro Katsura of incompetence. Police headquarters were set on fire and officers assaulted, until finally the Japanese Cabinet was overthrown.

Public opinion was then not in favor of peace negotiations with Russia. But, after the brief span of ten years, the entire Japanese nation had changed their attitude towards the Russians so completely that they welcomed enthusiastically all news of Russian victories.

Feelings and emotions change according to time and circumstance. The foreign policy of any country should be determined according to the permanent interests of the country, not according to the feelings and emotions prevailing at the moment. In the light of the relations between Japan and Russia, we can form a conjecture as to the future relations between Britain and Germany. It was not until Bismarck had retired from the Prussian Government that Britain fell out with Germany, and the policy of opposing Germany was adopted after the visit to France of King Edward VII. About three years after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany proposed to Britain the resumption of friendly relations. Following the settlement of Morocco Incident in 1911, England secretly sent Mr. (later Viscount) Haldane, Secretary of War, to Germany to discuss a plan for co-operation. Although the details of the plan are unknown, it is understood that the main questions discussed were the slowing down of the naval race between the two countries, and mutual observance of neutrality in case of war. The negotiations proved abortive, but it does not mean that the two countries did not want to come to an understanding.

According to the British, such an action would not jeopardize her friendship with France and Russia. But is this really so? In a speech in the House of Commons in 1911, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, stated that, "Although it is desirable to make a new friend, we dislike the idea of losing an old friend in order to win a new friend. We will make every effort to form new friendships, but never shall we desert our old friends." These are fine words, indeed, but it is understood that on the day following Haldane's departure for Germany the French and Russian Ambassadors in London hastily called at the British Foreign Office to make enquiries concerning Haldane's mission to Germany. Was Grey honest in his speech? It happened that the Anglo-German negotiations produced no successful results, or else, Anglo-German alliance would have long been a reality and the present war would probably have been avoided. Can we be sure that after the war Britain will not form an alliance with Germany? A year before the outbreak of the Great War, Johnston, a British authority on colonial affairs wrote a book on Foreign Policy in which he said, "At this

moment the entire British nation is watching the developments of the Italo-Turkish conflict and is worried over the militarism, expansionism and despotism of the Central European Powers. In reality, it is quite easy for Britain and Germany to reach an understanding, and very difficult for Britain and Russia to re-adjust their relations. To win Germany's friendship, Britain should allow her access to the Adriatic Sea and Constantinople; thus Britain will be able to avoid a conflict with Germany in the Atlantic." This shows that before the outbreak of the war a part of the British people were not in favor of a conflict with Germany. There is no doubt that after the conclusion of the war such ideas will easily gain popularity.

Therefore, it is probable that when the war is over it will be necessary for Britain to reach a *rapprochement* with Germany. By taking advantage of the "No-Separate-Peace Pact," Britain may gain the friendship of Germany, and will inevitably give China to Germany in exchange for German friendship after the war.

Whether Britain will win the war or not, she is in danger of losing her power. It is only by changing her traditional policy and forming an alliance with some strong Power on the basis of mutual benefit that she will be able to enjoy a long period of peace. Since she must benefit her ally without impairing her own interests, we can be sure that she will sacrifice the interests of some other friendly nation, a nation over which she exercises some control as a *quasi*-protectorate.

Whether Britain will choose Germany or Russia for an ally, China will be the first to suffer at her hands. Considering the difference in character and intellect between the Russians and the Germans, it is probable that the Russian would treat the Chinese more cruelly than the Germans would do, as may be proved by past experiences. Those who say that the Allies will win and therefore advocate China's entry into the war must be laboring under the delusion that China will gain benefits and honors from an Allied victory. They do not realize that China, with Russia at her back, will suffer a worse fate in case of an Allied victory than in case of an Allied defeat.

Whether the Allies will win or not, China will be Britain's victim. Whether the Allies will win or not, Japan will be adversely affected as a result of China's entry into the war. There is no doubt that, if Britain turns

China over to Russia, Russia will resume her drive southward and as a result the Japanese will be unable to enjoy peace and security in Manchuria and Korea. Although Japan and Russia have recently concluded an agreement, the agreement merely provides for the readjustment of their interests. In the meantime Russia's attention is engrossed by her war with Germany. When her formidable enemy is defeated, she will befriend Britain and try to gratify her own desires by seizing the fertile areas in the East. Since Britain hopes that Russia will not invade India, it is only reasonable to assume that she will in future help Russia to suppress Japanese influence in China.

Under such circumstances, what steps will Japan take to defend herself? If Japan pushes her influence southward she will come into conflict with Russia. Being defenseless and helpless, she will be doomed to national extinction as the result of an Anglo-Russian alliance. The fall of Japan will spell disaster for the whole of the Yellow race. In such case, Asia will forever be held in slavery by Europeans. This point is quite evident and needs no elaboration. On the other hand, if Britain is defeated and aligns herself with Germany, Germany will likewise endeavor to check Japanese influence in order to extend her own influence in Asia. From the above, it can be seen that the fate not only of China, but of Japan as well, turns on the question of China's entry into the war – a question to which all Asiatics should give their serious attention.

## Chapter IX

### CHINA AND JAPAN: NATURAL FRIENDS – UNNATURAL ENEMIES

It is clear now that without India Britain will only be a third-rate Power. The method hitherto employed by Britain for preserving India is to allow no country in Europe to become stronger than herself. After the present war, however, she will be compelled to abandon this policy and to join hands with either Russia or Germany. In either case, China will be sacrificed for the preservation of India. It is an open secret that while the war is still in progress the British are preparing their victims in anticipation of a post-war alliance with either Russia or Germany. The fact can not be dissembled. It is lamentable that the would-be victims should be so willing to place themselves at the disposal of Britain and allow themselves to be tortured and mangled. It is precisely for this purpose that the British are exerting their utmost to persuade China to join the war on the side of the Allies.

It will probably be argued, "If we do not join the war we shall be in imminent danger, but, if we do join the war, the danger will be staved off, at least for the time being. Since China has not the power of self-defense, continued observance of neutrality will not deter Britain from sacrificing her. She had better, therefore, make haste to win America's friendship in the hope of securing moral support." Such argument is not absolutely unreasonable, but the fact is that China in her present situation cannot afford to succumb to brute force and shut her eyes to impending danger. As America will never antagonize a strong world Power for the sake of a country in which she has no interest, she can not be relied upon by China.

Europeans and Americans talk about justice and righteousness only for themselves, not for the Yellow race. The American nation, whose Constitution is based on the principles of equality and liberty, was the first to advocate discrimination against the Yellow race. The United States may at this moment show us friendliness and sympathy, but when the time comes for Britain, Russia, and Germany to join their efforts to conquer China, will she oppose the conquest by using her whole strength to champion the cause of a different race?



Let us take Korea as an example. For thousands of years Korea was a tributary State of China. It was the United States that first seduced Korea into separating herself from China and sent a diplomatic representative to negotiate a treaty with that country. [Treaty of May 22, 1882, negotiated by Commodore Shufeldt and the first treaty between Korea and a Western Power, the British and German treaties being of a date eighteen months later. –Editor] Yet, when Britain and Japan entered into an alliance, and Korea was about to be annexed by Japan, the United States was the first to recall her minister from Korea, instead of responding to the Korean appeal for assistance. Resentful as the Korean intellectuals are towards Japan on account of the annexation of their country, they are even more so towards the United States for persuading it into a declaration of independence and then leaving it in the lurch. It is the old parable of a man that helped another with a ladder to ascend to the top of a hundred-foot tower and then snatched it away from under his feet. It is the United States that made Korea ascend the ladder and then snatched it away from under her feet.

However, the United States cannot be blamed for such action. As long as Korea existed as an independent State, Japan had no room for expansion. So far as the United States is concerned, the annexation of Korea cost her nothing more serious than an indirect, slight loss of trade. It should have been expected that a transient feeling of sympathy could not avail against the Japanese determination to annex Korea, which for Japan at that time was a matter of life or death. *Korea perished because it had relied upon somebody who could not be relied upon; the United States is not responsible for the fact of others putting faith in her and her promises.* At present China is likely to suffer the same fate as Korea has suffered, and the United States will be reproached again for not offering any assistance. When this happens, it will be too late to consider the suggestions to relieve the blunder committed in the first instance. Furthermore, should the United States really want to come to our assistance she will do so regardless of our entry into the war.

It is stated in some quarters that China has long ago violated her neutrality, that ever since she allowed the Japanese to land at Lungkow she has forfeited the friendship of the Germans, and that after the severance of relations neutrality is impossible whether war is declared or not. Such opinion shows crass ignorance. In considering the question as to whether China should maintain neutrality or not, we should judge ourselves by the

attitude we have meant to adopt towards Germany, not by any acts that have actually been committed against her. Besides, any fault which we may have committed can yet be rectified; but it is no use for us to try to gloss over our mistakes. The Japanese landing at Lungkow was agreed to by China because of force of circumstances. To be more exact, China was indirectly driven to do so by the British. As is generally known by all, the Chinese Government originally had no intention of allowing the Japanese to disembark. *The Book of Changes* rightly says: "Do not look back upon your distant past, and do not content yourself with only regretting your misconduct." It is wrong to violate one's neutrality even under coercion, but coercion may be regarded as an extenuating circumstance. If China would hereafter maintain an impartial attitude and would not submit again to coercion, she will in time redeem her past errors and recover her honor and dignity. If no strong protest was lodged by Germany after the Japanese landing at Lungkow China would still be able to maintain neutrality. Had there been a protest but no rupture of relations, neutrality could still be maintained. Even now, after the severance of relations, there is still a chance, though probably the last chance, to remedy the situation, provided that we do not join the war. Although we have broken off relations with Germany, we may yet rectify our conduct by refusing to join the Allies in spite of their coercion.

It is never too late to repent and there is no crime greater than to try to cover up wrongs done. If China would now show a strong determination not to yield to force, she will be respected for her bravery, instead of being looked upon as a servant of the Allies and a lackey of Britain. Nobody will then be able to sacrifice her. The best thing is to behave well from the beginning to the end, and the second best is to behave badly at the beginning but well at the end, which is difficult enough for anybody. By showing the world that China can achieve a difficult task, she can avoid being sacrificed. As it is, she imagines that since she has already violated her neutrality on one occasion, there is no need for her to act cautiously. In my opinion, the fact that China has violated her neutrality and several relations with Germany on account of force of circumstances, makes it all the more necessary for her to stiffen her attitude against Allied pressure in order to redeem the wrong that she has already committed. By following such a line of conduct she will be able to maintain her independence in the future. From now on, she should guard herself against such actions as to

permit the Japanese landing at Lungkow and the severance of relations with Germany. She must not persist in her misconduct.

There is of course the prospect that even continued observance of neutrality may not save China from being sacrificed. But let it be understood that if China joins the Allies she will be sacrificed for the interests of two countries; whereas, if she maintains neutrality, she may be sacrificed only for the interests of one country. If China joins the Allies, her interests will be sacrificed to satisfy the desire of some strong country which has not yet acquired sufficient colonial possessions. On the other hand, if she continues to observe neutrality other countries will probably fight for the possession of India, instead of for the possession of China, thereby affording her an opportunity gradually to remedy the situation. Therefore, if China joins the Allies, she is doomed to perish, but, if she continues to observe neutrality, the chances are that she will be able to preserve her existence. In short, the question as to whether China should join the war or not is a vital problem to China.

Let us turn aside from the subject of war. Among the European Powers is there anyone who has not the power to conquer China? The fact that they all have the power to conquer China and yet have not done so up to the present time, is due to (1) the Balance-of-Power Theory, and (2) convenience of exploitation. The Balance-of-Power Theory is known to everybody, so there is no need to expatiate upon it. As to exploitation, the various Powers realize that even an unconquered China can give them enough benefits, so they are not in a hurry to conquer her. However, after they have settled all the issues between themselves, they will begin their work of conquering the whole of China. As the time is still not yet ripe, an attempt by any Power to grab China will lead to a dispute with other Powers. Not only will such a Power be unable to monopolize the interests of China, but it will also be hated by the other Powers for being the first to take China. Accordingly, the suggestion to partition China was abandoned in favor of the proposal to preserve China's integrity.

If China thus continues to maintain her neutrality without changing her attitude at all, she will be in the same condition after the war as she was before. For, in the event of an overwhelming victory for Germany, Britain will not be able to offer China to Germany as the price for a German alliance. On the other hand, if Russia should become the strongest Power,

she will not be grateful to Britain for offering her China. The reason is that although Britain occupies a leading position in the China market, she cannot go so far as to claim that she alone can dispose of China in any way she likes. This fact has become more apparent since the break of the war. If Britain should fail to induce China to join the war on the side of the Allies, Britain's acquiescence in the conquest of China by another Power will be no more than an ordinary gesture, and cannot be regarded as a favor. If Britain's acquiescence cannot be regarded as a favor, the future strongest country will be under no obligation to enter into an alliance with Britain in consideration of Britain's attitude of acquiescence. As has repeatedly been stated above, if the Allies should win the war, Britain will be obliged to ally with Russia, and, if the Allies should lose, Britain will be obliged to ally with Germany. This is so from the British point of view.

But whether Germany or Russia, as the case may be, will find it necessary to ally with Britain after the conclusion of the war, depends on what advantages Britain has to offer. If Britain cannot offer China as a part of her own property to Germany or Russia, Germany or Russia will take China without thanking Britain. After the conclusion of the war, unless Russia and Germany will seek an alliance with Britain, they will fight for the possession of India before they try to conquer China. Why?

The reason is that with the loss of India the British Empire will be destroyed, and that Russia and Germany may then use the rest of their strength to conquer China without undue haste. After Russia or Germany has obtained India, she will probably be so satisfied as to be in no particular hurry to conquer China. Judging from the colonial exploitation by Russia and Germany in the past few years and from the factors contributing to the outbreak of the present war, I am convinced that, unless China herself looks for trouble, Russia and Germany will after the war expand their influence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia with Egypt and India as their chief objectives. Since her defeat in the Blast, Russia has reached an understanding with Japan, abandoned her project to exploit the Far East, and devoted her entire efforts to the exploitation of Eastern Europe. Britain has not only promised Constantinople to Russia but divided Persia into British and Russian spheres in influence. This is why Russia is now fighting on the side of the Allies.

Therefore, should Russia win the war, she will put Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro under her leadership, occupy Constantinople and turn Turkey into a vassal State. Then Egypt will also fall into her hands. At the same time, she will extend her influence from the Caucasus to Persia. The transport facilities which have been completed in these regions during the present war will be utilized by Russia for an invasion of India. Britain will be obliged to ally with Russia, but Russia herself has no necessity of allying with Britain.

To obtain China or India, Russia will have to use force. Any attempt to seize China will be assisted by Britain but resisted by Japan, and any attempt to seize India will be assisted by Japan but resisted by Britain. If Russia should try to seize India after grabbing China, Britain will by that time have developed her economic resources and improve her military power to such an extent that it will be practically impossible for Russia to succeed in the attempt. If, on the other hand, Russia should first grab India, Japan will not have conquered China by the time the grabbing process is finished, and China's interests will still remain intact. From Russia's viewpoint, it is advisable to seize India first. The same applies to Germany. That is why Germany adopted the so-called "Berlin-to-Baghdad" Railway Project, the purpose of which was to obtain access to India via Persia. It is certain that if Germany should win the present war, she will form an alliance with Bulgaria and Turkey and include Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania in the German Federal State, thereby extending Germany's eastern frontier to Persia. The purpose of any attempt to grab Persia is to grab India. As Germany has long been making preparation in this direction, a sudden change of policy to the conquest of China situated farther east will necessitate fresh preparations on a large scale. That is another reason why it is not worth while for Germany first to conquer China. Therefore, unless China ranges herself on the side of the Allies, placing herself at the disposal of Britain, the various Powers will follow the line of least resistance, that is to say, will try to take India first.

It is noteworthy that China is at present a free world market, which offers all foreign countries an equal chance for exploitation. Economically, any foreign country can draw large benefits from China without occupying her territory. The Open Door Policy and the "maintenance of China territorial integrity," are just as advantageous to foreign countries as the actual conquest of China. Accordingly, the greater the influence of any

country over the China market, the larger the benefits obtainable by it from China. In this light, any country which occupies India can enjoy the major part of the benefits from China, even if China remains independent. On the contrary, if any country occupies China, without occupying India, it will be unable to extract any benefits whatever from India. Incidentally, this is why China has so far enjoyed independence. It is just because China does not side with any one country to harm the interests of another country, thereby allowing every country a fair chance of competition in obtaining benefits from her, that the Powers have so far refrained from serious efforts to conquer her.

As long as China maintains strict neutrality, the various Powers will feel that it is more advantageous to leave China independent than to divide her up among themselves. The moment China shows any partiality toward any particular country, the various Powers will decide to conquer her. It must be emphasized that should Germany or Russia occupy China and leave Britain in possession of India, they will never have an opportunity to occupy, or obtain any benefits from India, but, if Germany or Russia should seize India from Britain, China's interests will still remain intact, and will never be monopolized by Japan.

In other words, any country which possesses India may at the same time derive benefits from China, but any country which occupies China without occupying India, cannot draw any benefits from India. Therefore, it will not serve the best interests of Germany and Russia to ally themselves with Britain for the purpose of conquering China. Britain can attain her object only if China would by her own action upset the present condition of things, thereby enabling Britain to offer her as a favor to some other country. That is why I say, "China's entry into the war will be beneficial to Britain only." After China's entry, Britain will be able to use her as a tool to be utilized in any way she likes. Therefore, participation in the war is a course leading to national extinction; the only way to preserve our national existence is to maintain neutrality.

After China's entry into the war, Britain will regard her as a vassal State and will be in a position to prevent any other Power from taking China. In such event, Britain's permission to conquer China will be looked upon as a favor. Any country which has Britain's gracious permission to occupy China will of course be benefited, and Britain by giving China, as a

present to that country will be able to preserve her own interests. That is why I say, "After China's entry she will be sacrificed for the interests of two countries." Needless to say, it is more likely that China will be sacrificed for the interests of two countries than for the interests of only one country.

In discussing international problems one must, first of all, grasp the incontrovertible facts regarding the interests of various countries, and then consider what are the best policies to be adopted by each country. By this process of reasoning we can reach a conclusion as to what our country should do and what it should not do. We must be absolutely dispassionate in our thinking. It is often said that there is every indication of an Allied victory, and that China should join the war to win their sympathy so that she may reap some benefits through participation in the Peace Conference. But it must be pointed out that in apportioning the spoils of war the victors will be guided by the respective interests and will not be moved by impulse or emotion. The Vienna Congress, which took place after the defeat of Napoleon, is a good example. The countries represented at the Congress condemned Napoleon for having deposed the King of Holland because he did not observe the Continental System. (Following the French defeat, the Emperor of Austria had interceded with Napoleon for the restoration of the King of Holland.)

Yet, the present made to England in appreciation of her assistance in defeating Napoleon was neither French territory nor any territory belonging to any of the countries which had aided Napoleon. The gift, consisting of two strategic points, viz. the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon, was chosen from among the Dutch Colonial possessions. It is generally supposed that by following at the heels of the victor some minor benefits may be picked up from the ground that he has trodden, but how is one to be sure? History shows that even allies of the victor are not free from the fate of territorial loss. The decisions made by Austria, France, England, and Prussia at the Vienna Congress had to be accepted willy-nilly by the minor countries participating in the Conference. Evidently, any strong country which has been defeated has still power enough to despoil the weak countries. If a weak nation attaches itself to a strong one engaged in war, it may, in case of the latter's victory, be called upon to participate in a Peace Conference, but the probability is that it will be victimized. Since, both in case of an Allied victory and in case of an Allied defeat, the only way for

her to avoid disaster is to remain neutral, the idea that, since an Allied victory is now a moral certainty, China must throw in her lot with the Allies, is absolutely untenable. I repeat, the only way now left to save China from peril is to maintain neutrality.

There are many ways certain to ruin a country, but there is no definite way to ensure its existence. If anyone of the factors which may cause the ruination of a country occurs, the country will be doomed. On the other hand, suppression of any one of the factors does not always mean that the security of the country is ensured. It is therefore evident that if China does not maintain neutrality she will perish, although, if she does maintain neutrality, nobody can be sure that she will continue to exist. Even in the present age the principles of diplomacy still deserve some consideration, but the matter is not so simple as merely making an alliance with one country for the purpose of resisting another, as many of my contemporaries seem to think.

In the meantime, the idea is current that China should either befriend the United States in order to resist Japan or befriend Japan in order to resist the United States. Both policies are wrong. There are justifiable reasons for China to befriend both Japan and the United States; there is no reason whatever to befriend the one in order to antagonize the other. Japan and China are in intimate relations. If China befriends Japan, she must at the same time endeavor to prevent any conflict from arising between Japan and United States so that Japan may accomplish her mission of aiding China to develop herself. The idea popular among Chinese officials of playing the United States off against Japan is a colossal mistake.

Speaking only from the military point of view, Japan is, of course, still inferior to the United States at the present moment. Ten years ago, the military and naval strength of the United States was practically nil, and it was impossible for her to strike war in any direction. But ten years have changed the American naval position so completely that the United States now builds two super-dreadnoughts per annum. She is gradually overtaking Japan. Last year, besides her ordinary naval program she passed a Bill for the construction, at a cost of US\$1,000, 000,000, of ten additional super-dreadnoughts and six additional cruisers, to be completed within a period of five years. This year, the United States Government has decided to reduce the period to three years. On severing relations with Germany, the United

States passed another U.S.\$1,000,000,000 naval expansion Bill. Again, on the day she declared war against Germany, she decided upon a war expenditure amounting to U.S.\$6,800,000,000,000 of which U.S.\$1,000,000,000 was earmarked for naval construction. Moreover, according to the recently announced naval construction program, the United States is going to build an invincible fleet unparalleled in history. The displacement of the battleships will be increased to 80,000 tons, and the speed to 25 knots, and in addition, each vessel will be equipped with fifteen 18-inch guns. Such craft will cost U.S.\$100,000,000 each and the guns will have a destructive power more than three times that of modern super-dreadnoughts. At least five such craft will be constructed, and the size and draught will be just small enough to permit them to pass through the Panama Canal without inconvenience. As for Japan, it will be several years before she will complete the construction of a fleet consisting only of eight battleships and four cruisers.

There is thus a wide difference in naval power between, these two countries. But when I say that it is a big mistake to play the United States against Japan, I do not mean that the United States cannot overpower Japan. What I mean is that should the United States fight with Japan and beat her, China will gain no benefit, although both the United States and Japan will suffer heavy losses. In the event of Japan being defeated, she will be conquered, or at least her territory will be reduced. That she will suffer heavy losses is beyond question. On the other hand, will the United States gain any benefits? Even if the United States should throw her entire national resources into a war with Japan and, as a result, gain victory, her strength will be seriously impaired. Yet what can she expect to get out of all this except some interests and advantages at the expense of China? But as made known to the whole world, she has the least ambition among the Powers to exploit China, if only because of the geographical situation.

Even after crushing Japan, the United States will still be unable to exercise supreme influence over China. While the results of the present war can hardly be predicted, it is safe to assert that after conclusion of peace the strongest World Power will be either Germany or Russia, for reasons which have already been fully explained in the foregoing chapters. It goes without saying that, should China join the war, and as a result be conquered by Germany or Russia, no room will be left for exploitation by the United States. But, if China maintains her neutrality and, as a result, preserve her

national existence, will Russia or Germany allow the United States to obtain special advantages from China? Certainly not. For, after beating Japan, American interests in China will come into conflict with German and Russian interests, and consequently the United States will have to fight with a first-rate Power.

As things stand, the United States has not the power to overcome Russia or Germany. By overthrowing Japan, therefore, the United States would invite trouble with a formidable rival, with the result that both parties would be worsted. It is evident therefore that an American war with Japan will benefit neither the United States nor Japan, much less China.

Should China desire an ally, she should not look beyond Japan and the United States of America. *The relationship between China and Japan is one of common existence or extinction. Without Japan, there would be no China; without China, there would be no Japan.* For the sake of establishing a lasting peace between the two countries, no trifling cause should be permitted to disturb their friend-ship. Next comes the United States of America. Although America is far away from us, her geographical position prescribes her to be China's natural friend, not her unnatural enemy. Moreover, both countries have a Republican form of Government, so they should endeavor mutually to assist each other.

Should there be no hope for China to develop, nothing more is to be said. But should China have a chance to develop her industries, assistance must be sought from Japan and the United States. China should rely on these two friendly States, for capital and technical advice as well as raw materials. Japan, because of her similarity in language and race with China, can be even of greater assistance to China than America, and on the reconciliation with Japan depends the welfare of China, peace in the Far East, the very civilization of the world. From the racial point of view, China and Japan are brother countries. From the political point of view, China and the United States are democratic countries, China being related to America as a pupil to his tutor. Therefore China is not only in a position, but also under the obligation, to harmonize American-Japanese relations, not to play one off against the other.

Under the principle of Pan-Asianism, Japan and China can together develop the natural resources in the West of the Pacific, while under the

Monroe Doctrine the United States can unify authority in the East of that ocean. Each should confine herself to her own field; then there will be no conflict whatsoever. By a concerted effort of these three Powers disarmament might some day be effected, and, going one step further, permanent peace of the world secured. This would not be to the benefit of China alone. Should China follow this as the guiding principle of her diplomacy, she would completely eliminate any possible cause of national extinction.

## Chapter X

### THE FATE OF CHINA

“To exist” means not to perish. To make something grow out of nothing is to develop. To prevent something from becoming nothing is to preserve.

Therefore, a country exists only when it is imperishable. The factors contributing to the rise and fall of a nation, are innumerable. The principal factor which enables a country to exist lies in the national consciousness, in the indomitable spirit of independence on the part of its Government and people. Only those nations which can neither be tempted with lucre nor overcome by force, can maintain their existence. Such a nation may be crushed almost out of existence, but it will eventually always rise again. Any country which pretends to be independent but lacks the qualities enumerated above, is doomed to extinction. This is not chopping logic. When a nation has an unconquerable spirit of independence, other nations will think it advisable to show respect for its independence. At any rate, other nations will refrain from violating its independence, on account of the international interests involved. Historical examples may be adduced to prove my theory, or, alternatively, the same conclusions can be reached by reasoning inductively from modern events.

Belgium has failed utterly to repel the attack of the Germans; the Belgian Government is now located at Le Havre with very little territory still left under its control. Nevertheless, not only do the Allies continue to respect the independence of Belgium but nobody can say that Belgium has perished. Even neutral countries show the highest respect to that country. It is so because the indomitable spirit of independence of the Belgians has proved to the world that Belgium is unconquerable. Even if the whole of Belgian territory were to fall into the hands of her enemy and all the Belgian troops be captured, we are sure that all the neutral countries will never for that reason doubt her existence.

In one sense Belgium has perished, but in another sense she has not; in one sense her people have fallen into captivity, but in another sense they have not. The people, the land, and the sovereignty of Belgium may have ceased to exist in form, but on account of the indomitable spirit of

independence they have persisted in spirit. Belgium was once forcibly incorporated into Holland, but her people; inspired by a strong, inflexible determination, finally managed to regain their liberty and independence. The character of the people makes them unconquerable. Although they may, for a while, yield to armed force, their nation will never perish. Any country which tries to hold them in permanent subjection, will suffer more than enjoy, and will eventually realize that it is not worthwhile to occupy their territory.

Greece is similar to Belgium. After having been conquered for thousands of years, she grew suddenly into a modern State. It is wrong to suppose that she now depends on the sympathy and justice of other countries for her existence. The rebirth of Greece is due to her national spirit, which not only has not flagged but has increased in vigor through many long years. She has never been completely subdued by Turkey, and for this reason other countries have aided her in recovering her independence. If Greece has revived by virtue of her unconquerable spirit, she can rely upon the same spirit for the maintenance of her existence. At the present time she is being subjected to extreme pressure by the Allies, yet she does not waver in her determination.

Greece is to the Allies as Belgium is to Germany, but is still regarded by the world as not having perished. Britain and France have violated Greek neutrality by landing their forces at Salonika, but the world does not consider Greece as siding with the British and French. Britain and France have been encouraging the revolutionary movement in Greece with a view to changing the Greek policy, but the King of Greece, mindful of the fate suffered by the Rumanians, has stoutly resisted the Anglo-French efforts. This explains why Greece can revive after having been conquered for more than 2,000 years, and how, though still weak, she can successfully resist the strong. As the Allies have not yet declared war on Greece, they cannot occupy her entire territory. Even if the British and French should occupy the whole of Greece, she will be no more conquered than Belgium, and I am sure that the peoples of neutral countries will not consider that she has perished, just as they do not consider that Belgium has perished.

Like Belgium, Greece continues to exist by reason of her unconquerable spirit. Every nation on earth should be able to preserve her

existence. Any nation which fails to maintain her spirit of independence, does not deserve to, and cannot possibly, exist as a nation.

It must be pointed out that though a country may labor under disadvantages, it can sooner or later extricate itself from its disadvantageous position. If any country, whose actions are restricted by the force of some other country, makes no effort to resist that force, no amount of advantages she may have bestowed on her will be of any use to her, since she has already lost the spirit of independence. It is an old saying, "A man may be robbed of everything but he must not allow himself to be robbed of his will-power." If a man must have will-power, so must a nation. If a nation allows herself to be deprived of her national determination, should she not be ashamed of herself, taking a lesson from the Lady of Sung and the Girl of Chi who resisted, at the cost of their lives, attempts to sully their honor. No country engaged in war can be absolutely sure of preserving its territorial integrity. After a nation has fought in self-defense but failed to preserve her territorial integrity, she may have succeeded in bringing home to the victor or aggressor that she cannot be deprived of her national determination. The victor or aggressor, realizing that the vanquished cannot be robbed of her will-power, will naturally refrain from bullying her unreasonably. Therefore, a country may maintain its power intact without winning a victory, and preserve its territorial integrity without putting up a strong defense. Britain and France, for instance, could have easily sent an army big enough to occupy Greece, but they have not done so simply because they realize that Greece cannot be robbed of her national determination.

Therefore, China should maintain neutrality as Belgium and Greece have done, whose difficulties in maintaining their neutrality are a hundred times greater than those of China. As an Anglo-French attack on the Balkans must be made via Greece, Britain and France have long tried to seize Greece for the purpose of extending their influence in the Balkans. At the same time Germany also has been trying to obtain Greece for the purpose of resisting British and French attempts. This is indisputable.

China is in a totally different position from Greece. The territory leased by China to Germany has been occupied by Japanese; the "Salonika" of China has been placed at the disposal of Japanese troops. Thus, China has already yielded to coercion, and shown partiality to the Allies. But

German and neutral countries know very well that the landing of the Japanese at Lungkow was in defiance of China's will and they believe that since the Lungkow landing China has remained neutral as before. At this moment, British French, Japanese and Russian pressure exerted upon us is certainly not as strong as that exerted upon Greece. As a matter of fact, Britain and Japan do not intend to exert pressure upon China. Why do not we follow the example of Greece? When the Central Powers exerted pressure upon Belgium, Belgium put up an armed resistance, and when the Allies attempted to coerce Greece, Greece did not submit to the coercion. China has not been subjected to such pressure as Belgium and Greece have been. Why then do we contemplate abandoning the attitude that we should maintain? Have we lost our national spirit?

It cannot be helped that we are not strong enough to resist the Allies, but it is undeniable that we must not allow our strength to be utilized by the Allies. China is inferior in financial resources, in naval power, and in technical ability. In normal times she makes special efforts to maintain friendly relations with Germany and to gain its favor. In all matters, especially in military training, education and science, she relies upon Germany for assistance. It is unjust, unwise and ungrateful to drop stones upon Germany when she has, so to speak, already fallen into the well.

Although China may gain some advantages by betraying a friend, material benefits will by no means compensate for the damage to her moral integrity. If our Government, as the leader of the people, displays such cupidity and ingratitude, China will have a most unsavory reputation as a selfish, mercenary nation. Any nation which yields readily to temptations of lucre, will be plundered, and any nation which shows no gratitude, will receive no kindnesses in return. Should China suffer another foreign invasion which, I am sure, will be far more terrible than all previous ones, no country will come to her rescue. Besides, if our Government acts in such a way, the people will not obey its orders. Demoralized as the Chinese are, the great masses of the people still consider it a shame to show ingratitude and covetousness. And when the Chinese Government shamelessly stoops to acts such as even the lowest scoundrels would not perpetrate, the people are justified in treating it with the utmost contempt and in taking absolutely no interest in the affairs of the State. Will the Government ever have the effrontery again to issue a decree calling upon the people to rally to its support in case of emergency, or to fulfill their duties to the State?

Any person, who loves mountains and rivers, abhors garbage and filth. Any person who enjoys wine, has no taste for adulterated liquors. Any person, who is fond of dress, objects to wearing soiled and stained clothes. Similarly, any person who takes interest in political affairs and wishes to fulfill his duties to the State, will go into retirement on seeing such ingratitude and covetousness on the part of the Government. The officials, who remain in the Government in spite of its ungrateful and covetous behavior, will sooner or later contract the habit of ingratitude and cupidity and thus hasten the downfall of the nation.

If China desires, at this critical moment, to overcome the danger of a foreign conquest, she must maintain an inflexible spirit of independence. If all weak nations could be conquered, there would have been no weak nations left in this twentieth century. In view of the fact that weak nations do exist, and that China is the only one in danger of national extinction, it is evident that the danger cannot be imputed to more effectness. As long as a nation has an unbending spirit of independence, it will revive after it has perished, or rise after it has fallen.

Besides Greece, Poland may be cited as another example. More than a century has passed since the partition of Poland, but lately Germany has occupied part of the Russian territory and suddenly set up a Polish State there. The Russians also have promised the Poles self-government after the conclusion of the war. It may be expected therefore that after the war is over Poland will be revived. The restoration of the Polish State by Germany and the promise of self-government by Russia have no other purpose than that of gaining the support of the Poles; there is no spirit of chivalry. The fact that Russia and Germany are so eager to win the goodwill of the Poles who have already been conquered, is due to no other factor than the unconquerable spirit of independence on the part of the Poles. If the children of a nation which has perished for over a hundred years can inspire so much awe and receive so much flattery, should China, which still exists as a nation, be afraid of oppression? China is a big country and yet she compares unfavorably with Belgium, Greece and even Poland. Who is to be blamed for her present condition?

The Chinese people all know that it is inadvisable to join the conflict and that it is unreasonable to declare war. This view has been



voiced by merchants, scholars and even some, military men and Government officials. The idea of entering the conflict and declaring war was at first suggested by a handful of politicians, and is now gaining popularity in Government and Parliamentary circles. But who will be responsible for the disastrous consequences?

China belongs to the Chinese people, upon whom rests the final decision in State matters. At this moment the Government shows not the slightest regard for public opinion and is acting in an arbitrary manner. Who should bear the responsibility for the danger to China's destiny? The Government and Parliament must not think that the people have no right to take them to task. It seems to be their intention to conceal the danger from the people, so that by the time the nation has perished it will be too late for anybody to take them to task. But since the people now realize that entry into the war will antagonize Germany unnecessarily, someone is bound, before the country has perished, to lead the people in an uprising against the Government. Losing the support of the people and without any assistance from foreign countries, it is probable that the Government will collapse before the fate of the nation is sealed. If a country is strong while its people are weak, the national strength is not evenly distributed; in such case, there will be the danger of committing irreparable blunders. On the other hand, if a country is weak while its people are strong, the people will vent its wrath by overthrowing the Government. This shows that the people cannot be trifled with.

The Chinese nation consists of 400,000,000 people, who have placed their common interests under the care of less than 2,000 officials. These officials have heavy responsibilities and, of course, they cannot be expected always to make the right decisions. But they should at least be conscientious. If, in the present case, they maintain that since they have decided upon a certain course of action they cannot reverse the decision simply on account of the people's opposition, we cannot but take that they mean to sacrifice the vital interests of 400,000,000 people for the purpose only of saving their own face. I hope that they would not choose this course but show that they still have a human heart.

China is at present like a man on a fleet horse galloping above a precipice. There is only one way to safety. By this way we can not only avert the present crisis but also lay the foundation of permanent security.

Let me repeat, as I have repeated many times already, "We must maintain strict neutrality in an unbending spirit of independence."